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JUSTICE JAMES D. HOPKINS: 
JURIST, DEAN, SCHOLAR AND EXPERT 
ON NEW YORK LAW* 
 
Jay C. Carlisle II** and Anthony DiPietro*** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It is an appropriate tribute to our late Dean James D. 
Hopkins1 that this edition of Pace Law Review be dedicated to 
a man who many leaders of the bench, bar, and academia 
believe is one of the twentieth century’s greatest common law 
appellate jurists.2 Dean Hopkins, better known as Judge 
 
  * This article is dedicated to Pace Law Professors Ralph M. Stein, Gary 
A. Munneke, and Josephine Y. King in recognition of their contributions to 
Pace Law School, and the legal community. 
  ** Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding professors at Pace University 
School of Law. He is a Commissioner for the New York State Law Revision 
Commission, an elected Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, and a 
Referee for the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. 
  *** Anthony DiPietro is a third-year law student at Pace University 
School of Law. He was a student of Professor Carlisle’s Advanced Civil 
Procedure Course (Spring 2012), which concentrated on the legal scholarship 
of former Pace Law Dean James D. Hopkins and former Pace Law School 
Professor and Chief Judge of New York Lawrence H. Cooke. Classmates Sean 
Convie, Keri Taylor, Matthew Herlihy, and Sam Suh made substantive 
contributions to this article, and the authors wish to thank them for all of 
their assistance. 
1. Hopkins retired as a senior associate justice from the New York State 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department, on December 31, 
1981. Prior to his appointment to the Appellate Division, Hopkins had served 
since 1958 as a county judge and Supreme Court Justice. He was appointed 
Dean of Pace Law School by the university’s then president, Dr. Edward 
Mortola, and served for eighteen months before retiring. In 1982, Hopkins 
received an honorary doctorate degree from Pace University. Thereafter, he 
served on the Law School Board of Visitors, and was a trusted confidante and 
advisor to Deans Janet Johnson, Steve Goldberg, Barbara Black, and Richard 
L. Ottinger. Dean Hopkins died on January 5, 1996. 
2. See generally Milton Mollen, Marcus G. Christ, Frank A. Gulotta, 
Frank S. McCullough, Wilfred Feinberg, Robert B. McKay, Maurice 
Rosenberg, Arthur O. Kimball, and Frances R. Schoenbach, A Tribute to 
Justice James D. Hopkins, 3 PACE L. REV. 437 (1983) [hereinafter A Tribute to 
1
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Hopkins, was Pace Law School’s second Dean from 1982 to 
1983, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of New York, 
and a justice of the Appellate Division for the Second 
Department from 1962 to 1981.3 He authored hundreds of 
significant majority, dissenting, and concurring judicial 
opinions on New York law,4 many of which continue to be 
relevant to the development of substantive and procedural law 
in the Empire State.5 Hopkins’s opinions have been cited and 
relied on by courts throughout the nation.6 He is recognized 
and praised as a “compleat jurist,”7 a leading law reformer,8 
and an outstanding scholar.9 
 
 
Justice James D. Hopkins], available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/1 (cumulative dedication from 
friends and colleagues of Judge Hopkins in appreciation of his life, public 
service, legal scholarship, and judicial temperament). 
3. John P. Cohalan Jr., James D. Hopkins, An Appreciation, 3 PACE L. 
REV. 479, 479 (1983). 
4. See discussion infra Part III; see also A Tribute to Justice James D. 
Hopkins, supra note 2, at 450 (“He is a superb legal craftsman who has left 
the law richer in sound precedent for the opinions he has written during more 
than [twenty-three] years upon the bench”); Josephine Y. King, 
Accountability for Tortious Conduct: Judge Hopkins Parses the Law, 3 PACE 
L. REV. 549 (1983), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/9 
(observing Judge Hopkins's substantial contributions to tort law). 
5. See discussion infra Parts VI-VIII (Hopkins made substantial 
contributions to New York law and his opinions on criminal law and 
procedure continue to be influential in the progression of the Miranda 
doctrine, free exercise of religion, and search and seizure law). 
6. See generally William A. Grimes, The Hopkins Opinions: Criminal 
Law and Procedure, 3 PACE L. REV. 521 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/7; Robert A. Leflar, Quality in 
Judicial Opinions, 3 PACE L. REV. 579 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/10. 
7. Robert MacCrate, A Compleat Jurist, 3 PACE L. REV. 593 (1983), 
available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/11. 
8. See generally id.; Arthur Karger, Judge James D. Hopkins’ Philosophy 
of Judicial Decision Making and His Contributions to Appellate Procedural 
Reform, 3 PACE L. REV. 535 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/8. 
9. See Karger, supra note 8, at 544; Josephine Y. King, Justice James D. 
Hopkins, Jurist, Dean, Colleague, Teacher: The Man Behind the Hopkins 
Award, WESTCHESTER CNTY. BAR ASS’N NEWSLETTER (WCBA, White Plains, 
N.Y.), Apr. 2008, at 7, 17. See generally Margaret Mary Fitzpatrick & John 
Sherlock, Portrait of the Judge as an Artist (with Apologies to James Joyce), 3 
PACE. L. REV. 495 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/4. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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Hopkins has been compared to the legendary Judge 
Benjamin Cardozo10 and many wonder why our Dean did not 
serve on the New York Court of Appeals or on the U. S. 
Supreme Court.11 The Pace Law School faculty and other Pace 
University colleagues rate him as one of our best Deans and as 
a superb colleague whose contributions were monumental.12 
During Hopkins’s eighteen month deanship, he strengthened 
the faculty, established a health law program, expanded the 
law school’s environmental law centers, and engaged in several 
successful outreach activities. In 1982, Pace Law School 
awarded Hopkins an honorary doctorate for his 
accomplishments. The first faculty chair was established in his 
name and was inaugurated in 1989.13 Thus it is fitting that 
thirty years after Hopkins’s retirement as Dean of Pace 
University School of Law and Senior Associate Justice of the 
world’s busiest intermediate appellate court that his 
contributions to the development of New York law be the 
subject of this article, which will discuss his life and public 
service,14 his appellate jurisprudence,15 his legal scholarship,16 
and his deanship at Pace University School of Law.17 
 
 
 
10. Fitzpatrick & Sherlock, supra note 9, at 503 (“In presenting Judge 
Hopkins with a copy of the Pocket Constitutionalist, Professor Paul R. Baier 
inscribed, ‘To Justice James Hopkins, whose judicial flame has always 
reminded me of Benjamin Cardozo.’”); see also Leflar, supra note 6, at 591-92. 
11. John P. Cohalan, Jr., James D. Hopkins, an Appreciation, 3 PACE. L. 
REV. 479, 479 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/3 (“That he labored in the semi-
obscurity of the appellate division rather than in the fierce white light of the 
court of appeals in Albany, or even in the august chamber of the United 
States Supreme Court remains something of a mystery”). 
12. King, supra note 9, at 17; Joseph M. Pastore, Jr., Could Jimmy 
Hopkins Have Run Today?, JOURNAL NEWS, Jul. 20, 1996; see also discussion 
infra Part IV (Interviews with Professors Nicholas A. Robinson, James 
Fishman, John Humbach, Merril Sobie, Gayl S. Westerman). 
13. See James D. Hopkins Professor of Law Memorial Lecture, PACE 
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://law.pace.edu/hopkinslecture (last visited Aug. 23, 
2012). 
14. See discussion infra Parts II-III. 
15. See discussion infra Parts V-VIII. 
16. See discussion infra Part V. 
17. See discussion infra Part IV. 
3
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II. Background 
 
Dean Hopkins was born on March 24, 1911, in the town of 
North Castle, Westchester County, New York. He enjoyed a 
rural and humble childhood.18 As a young boy, Hopkins had 
strong ties to his family, and would reminisce with friends 
about when he would travel with his father in the back of a 
horse-drawn cart from the hamlet of Armonk to the Village of 
White Plains to conduct the family’s affairs. 19 Despite his 
modest surroundings, Hopkins’s upbringing did not impinge 
upon his educational development nor restrict his future 
professional opportunities. After attending a one-room school in 
Armonk and graduating from Pleasantville High School, 
Hopkins graduated from Columbia College with a Bachelor’s 
degree in June of 1931.20 Two years later, Hopkins received his 
law diploma from Columbia School of Law.21 The following 
year, he was admitted to practice law in New York.22 Hopkins 
entered private practice,23 and later became a partner at the 
law firm of Bleakley,24 Platt and Walker.25 
 
18. Interview with John A. Humbach, former Assoc. Dean, and current 
Professor of Law, Pace Univ. Sch. of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Mar. 21, 
2012). 
19. Id. 
20. A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 448. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. Hopkins also worked at the law firm of Strang and Taylor before 
becoming a partner at Bleakley, Platt and Walker (now known as Bleakley, 
Platt & Schmidt, LLP). Id. 
24. Hopkins was a protégé of William Francis Bleakley, New York State 
Supreme Court Justice. 
25. See Firm History, BLEAKLEY PLATT & SCHMIDT, LLP, 
http://www.bpslaw.com/firm-history.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2012). 
 
Judge Bleakley served as a New York State Supreme Court 
Justice prior to running for Governor of New York in 1936. 
Livingston Platt, a successful attorney in private practice, 
also had extensive experience in local, state and national 
politics. Bleakley Platt had deep roots in White Plains, 
Westchester County and the Hudson Valley. Judge Bleakley 
drafted the first Westchester County Charter and then 
served as Westchester's first County Executive. Judge 
Bleakley was succeeded as County Executive by another 
member of the Firm, James D. Hopkins . . . [who] served as 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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Aside from his private practice, Hopkins also served a long 
and distinguished public service career. From 1938 to 1943, he 
was Councilman of the Town of North Castle.26 Hopkins was 
elected Supervisor of the Town of North Castle for five 
consecutive two-year terms.27 From 1951 to 1953, Hopkins was 
Chairman of the Westchester County Board of Supervisors.28 
Shortly thereafter, Hopkins was elected and served as 
Westchester County Executive for the next four years.29 In the 
fall of 1957, he was elected County Judge.30 Hopkins became 
the first and only individual to have ever served the highest 
level in all three branches of government in Westchester 
County.31 
In the wake of Hopkins’s remarkable achievements in 
Westchester County, Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed 
him to the Supreme Court for the Ninth Judicial District in 
September 1960.32 In 1962, Governor Rockefeller appointed 
Hopkins to the Appellate Division, Second Department.33 Until 
his retirement on December 31, 1981, Hopkins served with 
distinction as a Supreme Court Justice on the Appellate 
 
a Justice on the Appellate Division, Second Department of 
the State Supreme Court. Arthur B. Brennan and Frederick 
G. Schmidt also attained distinction in the Appellate 
Division. Three additional Firm alumni sat as State 
Supreme Court Justices. One of these Justices also served 
as Surrogate for Westchester County. In the late 1980's, two 
former Bleakley Platt partners simultaneously held federal 
chief judgeships: Honorable Charles L. Brieant, U.S.D.J., 
former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, and Honorable Thomas 
L. Platt, U.S.D.J., former Chief Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 
 
Id. 
26. A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 448. 
27. Id. In fact, Hopkins followed in the footsteps of his grandfather, his 
great grandfather, and his great-great grandfather when he served as 
Supervisor of the Town of North Castle. See id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
5
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Division.34 
Throughout his tenure on the bench, Hopkins’s colleagues 
held him in the highest esteem.35 One colleague, former St. 
John’s Law School Dean and Associate Judge on the New York 
Court of Appeals, Joseph W. Bellacosa, referred to Hopkins as 
an adopted Associate Judge of the New York Court of 
Appeals.36 Judge Bellacosa exclaimed, “[a]mongst members of 
his own court, past and present, he is regarded as being the 
epitome of wisdom, clarity of expression, eclecticism of interest, 
and correctness.”37 
 
 
34. Id. at 449. 
35. Id. The Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, Second 
Department, Milton Mollen wrote, “in the history of the law and the search 
for true justice, it can be said with absolute assurance that Justice James D. 
Hopkins is such a man.” Id. at 437. Presiding Justice Marcus G. Christ 
stated, “[h]e was successful in bringing others to his point of view by stating 
his points in a manner that permitted an adversary to come easily around 
without loss of face.” Id. at 442. Presiding Justice Frank A. Gulotta stated, 
“[s]uffice it to say, however, that to ascertain the respect and the esteem in 
which his opinions are held, one need only note how time and again the 
[C]ourt of [A]ppeals has ‘[a]ffirmed on the opinion of Judge Hopkins, J.’ His 
writings demonstrate a great clarity of thought, a depth of knowledge and a 
sharp analysis of problems.” Id. at 445. Justice Frank S. McCullough stated, 
“[h]e is independent without being arrogant, decisive but impartial, patient 
and courteous, with a social consciousness honed by public service and a 
warm understanding heart.” Id. at 449. United States Court of Appeals Judge 
Wilfred Feinberg stated, “[w]hat I do know is that all I ever heard about 
Jimmy Hopkins was undiluted praise, coming from the most unlikely sources 
- political opponents, rivals for various appointments, people who did not 
share his views on one matter or another.” Id. at 451. New York Uuniversity 
Law School Dean Robert B. McKay stated, “[i]t is indeed impressive to see 
Justice Hopkins adapt himself to each particular audience in his customary 
relaxed manner—informational but informal, helpful but authoritative.” Id. 
at 453. Columbia Law School Professor Maurice Rosenberg stated, “[m]y 
friendship with Justice Hopkins over the years has convinced me that 
working with him must have been, for his colleagues on the court and for all 
the others who labored alongside him in each branch of state government, a 
source of pure gratification.” Id. at 456. Arthur O. Kimball, Esq. stated, “[y]ou 
begin to see the fineness of his judgment, the clarity of his intelligence, the 
real depth of his character.” Id. at 458. 
36. Joseph W. Bellacosa, The Adopted Judge of the New York State Court 
of Appeals: James D. Hopkins, 3 PACE L. REV. 461, 463 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/2. 
37. Id. Judge Bellacosa stated of Judge Hopkins, “[i]t is one of his 
greatest attributes that he did not allow his own lustre to diminish or darken 
the considerable qualities of the justices who served with him.” Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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III. Public Service 
 
Hopkins authored hundreds of opinions as the voice of the 
majority of the Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second 
Department, of New York State, and he earned the respect of 
the New York legal community.38 He published scholarly 
articles on a variety of legal issues including topics such as 
judicial discretion in sentencing,39 judicial decision making,40 
and the role of intermediate appellate courts.41 
Despite being a universally respected member of the 
busiest appellate court in the state,42 he retained a modest, 
unassuming, and respectful personality.43 This respect reached 
beyond his colleagues, to include the entire judicial process, 
and, in particular, to the distinction of powers between the 
New York Legislature and the courts, as well as the different 
roles of the courts in appellate hierarchy.44 Hopkins stressed 
 
38. Cohalan, Jr., supra note 11, at 479. “Every step in his career 
appeared to point towards the ultimate goals of high achievement, the 
respect and esteem of his fellows, and a permanent position in the legal 
history of our state.” Id. at 492. 
39. See James D. Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A Method of 
Swift Appellate Action, 23 UCLA L. REV. 491 (1976) [hereinafter Hopkins, 
Reviewing Sentencing Discretion] (advocating against the arbitrary nature of 
sentencing procedures). 
40. See James D. Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process: A 
Preliminary Theory of Decision, 33 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1966) [hereinafter 
Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process] (discussing the theory of legal 
decision-making and application of law). 
41. See James D. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 
41 BROOK. L. REV. 459 (1975) [hereinafter Hopkins, The Role of an 
Intermediate Appellate Court] (discussing the role of the intermediate court, 
and the interplay that occurs between the judiciary and the legislative 
branch of government). 
42. Bellacosa, supra note 36, at 462. 
43. Cohalan, Jr., supra note 11, at 491-92 (“Never one to push himself 
forward, he was at all times ready and willing to help anyone in any problem 
presented, and would go out of his way to be of assistance.”). 
44. See discussion infra Part V. An example of Hopkins’s directly 
appealing to the New York Legislature was illustrated in Fillyow v. Cnty. Of 
Westchester, where he stated, 
 
Doubtless, the granting of the count’s [sic] motion seems an 
unnecessary hardship, stressing technicalities rather than 
the realities of the situation, since there is no claim that the 
county authorities did not receive the summons from the 
7
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that the duty of the intermediate court was to identify 
emerging trends in the law and to control the flow of cases that 
reached the highest court.45 He observed that the intermediate 
court was better equipped to engage in fact development, and 
he believed it was the court’s duty to present cases to the Court 
of Appeals in an effective and efficient manner.46 
Hopkins was particularly mindful of his responsibilities to 
the Court of Appeals. He was aware that deciding a case at the 
intermediate appellate level was subject to appeal, and 
believed that “much may be done in the determination of the 
case to put it into proper perspective for the highest court.”47 
He advanced the idea that intermediate courts should achieve 
three goals when writing legal opinions.48 First, the court must 
“make the determinations of fact necessary for the resolution of 
the appeal clearly and completely.”49 Second, it must write on 
the issues of law so varying positions are fully delineated, and 
third, make its disposition without leaving undecided any issue 
critical to the rights of the parties.50 He explained that a court’s 
 
employee. . . .[While recognizing that this interpretation of 
the law may be unfair, such unfairness resulting from the 
law] is a matter of concern for the legislature, and not for 
the court, which must enforce the law as it reads. 
 
225 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849-50 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (citations omitted). To effect change 
in the law, Hopkins believed that “[it is the role of intermediate courts] to 
stimulate revision in the law, either by the highest court through common 
law doctrine or by the legislature through the enactment of statutes.” 
Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 41, at 464. 
The two ways an intermediate court could achieve this is to either “make a 
direct appeal to the legislature for a change in the law” or “make a direct 
statement to the highest court in support of a change in existing doctrine.” Id. 
at 464-65. 
45. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 41, 
at 464 (“[T]he general flow of litigation realistically is controlled by the 
intermediate courts of appeal.”). 
46. Id. (“[S]ince the full flow of appeals is centered in the intermediate 
courts, it is those courts which are in a better position to determine in what 
areas of the law confusion is occurring and where reform or clarification is 
necessary.”). 
47. Id. at 469. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. (“When these three criteria are observed, the highest court is 
enabled to gauge the importance of the questions and to address itself to 
them without uncertainty as to the posture of the case before it.”). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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opinion allow a higher court to understand, address, and 
efficiently dispose the case.51 Furthermore, Hopkins routinely 
acknowledged that intermediate courts could affect revisions in 
the law by certifying questions directly to the highest court.52 
Hopkins acknowledged that certifications to the highest court 
should be used sparingly.53 
In addition to Hopkins’s judicial duties, he was an active 
member within the legal community. He always wanted to 
share his knowledge and understanding of the law with his 
judicial colleagues, other lawyers, and the general public.54 
Thus, Hopkins served on the faculties of many judicial 
seminars,55 sat on numerous committees,56 and was a member 
of countless legal organizations.57 In addition, he authored 
many law review articles58 and traveled extensively to attend 
numerous judicial functions.59 Moreover, he coauthored a book 
with former ABA President Robert MacCrate and Columbia 
Law Professor Maurice Rosenberg, entitled Appellate Justice in 
New York.60 The authors studied appellate judges in New York 
and made several recommendations to improve the state court 
system.61 
 
51. Id. (“[I]f the discussion of the law in the intermediate court has been 
thorough and conforms to the view of the highest court, the latter’s 
determination may be made by a simple affirmance without opinion or even 
by an affirmance on the opinion in the intermediate court.”). 
52. Id. at 468. 
53. Id. (“The question so certified may be premature or a duplication of a 
question already before the court.”). 
54. See A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 459. 
55. Dean Hopkins served on the faculties of judicial seminars sponsored 
by the Institute of Judicial Administration of New York University, the 
Appellate Judges’ Conference, and the District Attorneys’ Association. 
56. Dean Hopkins served as Chairman of the Judicial Section of the New 
York State Bar Association, Director of the National College of the State 
Judiciary, and Chairman of the Appellate Judges’ Conference of the 
American Bar Association. 
57. Dean Hopkins was a member of the Federal-State Council of Judges, 
the Advisory Council for Appellate Judges, the Committee on Uniform 
Admission Practice, and the Temporary State Commission of Judicial 
Conduct. 
58. See infra note 106. 
59. Cohalan, Jr., supra note 11, at 492-93. 
60. ROBERT MACCRATE, JAMES D. HOPKINS & MAURICE ROSENBERG, 
APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK (1982). 
61. Id. 
9
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Hopkins served the Columbia Law School Alumni 
Association for more than thirty years.62 He served as 
President of the Association between 1974 and 1976.63 In 
recognition of his services, Columbia awarded him its Medal for 
Conspicuous Alumni Service.64 Additionally, in 1986, Columbia 
Law School awarded him its Medal for Excellence.65 This 
prestigious award is presented annually to Columbia Law 
School alumni or faculty who exemplify the qualities of 
character, intellect, and social and professional responsibility 
that the School seeks to instill in its students.66 
 
IV. Pace University School of Law 
 
After two decades serving on the New York Supreme Court 
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, Justice 
Hopkins retired and agreed to accept the position of Interim 
Dean of Pace University School of Law.67 Hopkins succeeded 
Dean Robert B. Fleming in January 1982, who retired after 
many years of service in legal education.68 The law school 
faculty was divided on a number of issues regarding the 
School’s long-term direction.69 Hopkins was asked to unify the 
faculty and establish common long-term goals for the Law 
School.70 He could have chosen an easier assignment, but he 
accepted the invitation.71 Wilfred Feinberg, United States 
Court of Appeals Judge for the Second Circuit and longtime 
Westchester resident, remarked that “anyone who [knew] 
Jimmy knows that he would never turn a deaf ear to a lawyer 
or law school (or anyone else, for that matter) in need.”72 
 
62. A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 455. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 449. 
65. Winter Luncheon, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/alumni/events/winter-luncheon (last visited Oct. 
14, 2012) 
66. Id. 
67. Interview with John A. Humbach, supra note 18. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 452. Clearly, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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Hopkins did not have any personal motives for accepting 
the position of Interim Dean at Pace Law School—except to 
serve those around him.73 He was delighted that Westchester 
County was developing its own law school and wanted to be 
part of ensuring its future success.74 His decision to become 
Dean at Pace Law School represented his commitment to the 
law and to legal education.75 
Within months after his appointment, Hopkins achieved 
significant results.76 He “bridged, and largely eliminated the 
friction that existed throughout the School.”77 Hopkins 
succeeded because he “listened” and he was “fair.”78 Hopkins 
recognized that he was an academic novice and fully 
understood he needed to remain impartial and learn from the 
Law School faculty.79 Hopkins was a listener who would 
frequently have lunch with the faculty in the cafeteria.80 In the 
non-confrontational setting of the lunchroom, the faculty 
discussed their concerns.81 Hopkins was receptive and 
encouraged faculty input.82 He then generated solutions to 
faculty problems.83 
Hopkins treated all those that came before him with 
dignity and good will, even when they disagreed with him.84 
While presiding over faculty meetings, Hopkins always 
remained impartial, considered opposing arguments, and 
explained the underlying reasons for his final deposition of 
 
Dean Hopkins did not turn a deaf ear to Pace Law School in its hour of need. 
As his colleagues at Pace Law School have suggested, Dean Hopkins loved to 
serve those around him, and he was not ready to retire from serving the legal 
community after working for nearly fifty years. Interview with John A. 
Humbach, supra note 18. 
73. Interview with John A. Humbach, supra note 18. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
11
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each matter set before him.85 Importantly, he was not afraid to 
make a difficult and necessary decision when required.86 
Hopkins was successful in eliminating the friction within the 
Pace Law School faculty by adopting a “listening” and “fair” 
approach to his deanship.87 Undoubtedly, Hopkins’s desire to 
treat everyone equally and his “approachable” demeanor also 
enhanced his sense of fairness.88 Furthermore, his affable, 
friendly, and reserved nature made him more approachable to 
faculty and students.89 
Hopkins built confidence among the faculty by supporting 
collegial faculty governance, and not decanal (or presidential) 
dictation.90 Moreover, his qualities set an example for the 
faculty to follow. As a former judge and well known public 
leader, he brought honor and distinction to the leadership of 
the dean’s office.91 He supported scholarship and good teaching, 
and knew that legal education is essential to the profession of 
law.92 Through him, the fledgling Pace Law School was given a 
strong endorsement within the legal profession in New York.93 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. “His genius was bringing the faculty together and creating a non-
confrontational productive atmosphere. It was greatly needed. He also 
encouraged individual faculty to be creative and was very supportive.” 
Interview with Merril Sobie, Professor of Law, Pace Univ. Sch. of Law, in 
White Plains, N.Y. (Mar. 21, 2012). 
88. E-mail from Nicholas A. Robinson, Professor of Law, Pace Univ. Sch. 
of Law, to Jay Carlisle, Professor of Law, Pace Univ. Sch. of Law (July 11, 
2012) (on file with author). 
89. Interview with Nicholas A. Robinson, Professor of Law, Pace Univ. 
Sch. of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (July 11, 2012). 
90. “His skills as the head of the County Board of Supervisors served 
him well in running the ‘business’ end of the law school. His political (in the 
best sense of the word) acumen—proven as the legislative leader he had 
been—led him to shape faculty discussions and build agreement among 
competing or disagreeing faculty factions.” Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. Dean Hopkins spent a lot of time focusing on the teaching of legal 
scholarship, and sought to maintain such focus amongst his colleagues at 
Pace University School of Law. His politeness, civility, and respect amongst 
the faculty created good relations and helped foster the progression of 
student affairs, academic curriculum, and school outreach. Interview with 
James J. Fishman, former Assoc. Dean and current Professor of Law, Pace 
Univ. Sch. of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (July 19, 2012). 
93. Interview with Nicholas A. Robinson, supra note 89. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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His presence alone gave Pace Law a “kosher seal of approval.”94 
Professor James Fishman served as Associate Dean during 
Hopkins’s tenure.95 He remarked that Hopkins was “a regular 
guy,” whose role as a dean, teacher, and leader within the Law 
School was marked by extraordinary humility.96 Remarkably, 
Hopkins labored without any pretentions or illusions about the 
powers he attained throughout his lifetime.97 Many of his 
colleagues became Hopkins supporters because they were 
“amazed that such a successful and well known man could be 
so humble and fundamentally decent.”98 Hopkins’s 
management style helped spark the progression and 
development of essential law school initiatives in the clinical, 
environmental, and health law programs. Aside from his legal 
ingenuity, Hopkins was a teller of humor, appreciative of 
poetry, a fan of baseball, a renaissance “guru,” and intrigued by 
all facets of historical and political occurrences.99 
Pace Law Professor Gayl S. Westerman was also 
impressed by Justice Hopkins’s legal and moral excellence. As 
a former student at Pace University School of Law, she was the 
first to intern for Hopkins at the appellate division.100 Her time 
with then Justice Hopkins proved to be invaluable, as she left 
her judicial internship feeling “privilege[d] getting to know and 
to work with one of the most intelligent jurists of our time.”101 
Although she was only a student at the time, Hopkins included 
Professor Westerman in every aspect of his legal work, and 
always shared “his approach to the law which was unfailingly 
efficient and fair.”102 
 
94. Interview with James J. Fishman, supra note 92. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Interview with Gayl S. Westerman, Professor of Law, Pace Univ. 
Sch. of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (July 30, 2012) ("During my third year at 
the law school, 1980-81, a competition was announced for an internship in 
the New York Supreme Court, Intermediate Appellate Division. It was the 
first of its kind created at Pace and I was honored to be chosen as the first 
Pace Judicial Intern.”). 
101. Id. Professor Westerman recalled that Dean Hopkins wrote all of 
his judicial opinions in longhand on yellow legal pads. Id. 
102. Id. Professor Westerman stated “certainly he and I both knew that 
13
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Today, a distinguished member of the Pace Law faculty 
holds the title of James D. Hopkins Professor of Law for a two-
year term in recognition of their outstanding scholarship and 
teaching.103 As Professor Nicholas A. Robinson, friend and 
colleague of Hopkins, stated “we must recall Hopkins, in the 
finest tradition of our learned profession. All of us who have 
held the Hopkins chair implicitly carry on his scholarly 
traditions and his devotion to public service.”104 
 
V. Judicial Excellence and Scholarship 
 
A. Background  
 
During his two decades on the appellate bench (1962-
1981), Hopkins authored more than one hundred and forty 
majority opinions,105 and countless concurring and dissenting 
opinions. Hopkins also wrote numerous scholarly articles 
during his time on the appellate bench.106 Despite the changing 
 
the experience would be the most valuable of my legal education. It was an 
especial honor then for me to come onto the faculty of Pace Law School just as 
Judge Hopkins was coming on as Dean.” Id. 
103. James D. Hopkins Professor of Law Memorial Lecture, supra note 
13. Since 1989, twelve faculty members have received the Hopkins 
professorship: Professor Linda C. Fentiman (2012), Professor John R. Nolon 
(2009), Professor Bennett L. Gershman (2007), Professor Michael B. Mushlin 
(2005), Professor Barbara Black (2003), Professor Donald Doernberg (2001), 
Professor Jeffrey G. Miller (1999), Professor James J. Fishman (1997), 
Professor M. Stuart Madden (1995), Professor John A. Humbach (1993), 
Professor Nicholas A. Robinson (1991), and Professor Maurice Rosenberg 
(1989). Id. 
104. Interview with Nicholas A. Robinson, supra note 89. 
105. The author produced a memorandum chronologically identifying 
those majority opinions that Hopkins authored during his tenure on the 
bench of the county court (seventeen opinions), the New York Supreme Court 
(forty-seven opinions), and the Appellate Division (144 opinions). 
Memorandum from Jay Carlisle, Professor of Law, Pace Univ. Sch. of Law 
(May 1, 2012) (on file with author). 
106. See, e.g., Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion, supra note 39; 
Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process, supra note 40; Hopkins, The Role 
of an Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 41; James D. Hopkins, The 
Development of Realism in Law and Literature During the Period 1883-1933: 
The Cultural Resemblance, 4 PACE L. REV. 29 (1983) [hereinafter Hopkins, 
The Development of Realism]; James D. Hopkins, The Winds of Change: New 
Styles in the Appellate Process, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1975) [hereinafter 
Hopkins, The Winds of Change]; James D. Hopkins, Small Sparks from a 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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dynamics of law and society during Hopkins’s tenure on the 
appellate bench, his philosophy on the role of courts and judges 
within society was a single constant.107 His philosophy on the 
role of courts within the community dictated that “fair” and 
“just” proceedings were to be a common theme woven 
throughout his judicial works.108 
Hopkins recognized that the law was experiencing a 
“revolution of ideas,” with a significant number of settled rules 
and precedents being changed during his tenure on the 
bench.109 He firmly believed that the “revolution of ideas” 
included fundamental developments in tort litigation,110 
 
Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate Process, 38 BROOK. L. REV. 551 
(1972) [hereinafter Hopkins, Small Sparks]; James D. Hopkins, Public Policy 
and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. L. REV. 323 (1971) 
[hereinafter Hopkins, Public Policy]; James D. Hopkins, Federal Habeas 
Corpus: Easing the Tension Between State and Federal Courts, 44 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 660 (1970) [hereinafter Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus]; James D. 
Hopkins, The Formation of Rules: A Preliminary Theory of Decision, 35 
BROOK. L. REV. 165 (1969) [hereinafter Hopkins, The Formation of Rules]; 
James D. Hopkins, Book Review, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1977) [hereinafter 
Hopkins, Book Review]. 
107. See King, supra note 4, at 577-78 (“He appreciated the separation of 
governmental powers and the need to maintain a delicate balance between 
legislatures and courts in modifying established rules of law.”). 
108. Id. at 578 (“Judge Hopkins seems to have been able always to draw 
the line, on legal grounds, on pragmatic grounds and on policy grounds. 
Doubtless, many have lauded Judge Hopkins as a judge's judge and a 
lawyer's lawyer; let it also be said, he is a scholar's delight.”). 
109. James D. Hopkins, Judiciary Night 1970, 18 NASSAU LAW. 55 (1970) 
[hereinafter Hopkins, Judiciary Night] (observing social, technological, and 
economic changes that had affected the judiciary during the 1970s). Hopkins 
identified numerous events that had influenced the progression of the law 
during this era. Namely, he observed the technological advancements 
affecting transportation, communication, and the tempo of daily activities. Id. 
110. In 1972, there was a significant change in tort law, as the New 
York Court of Appeals reworked the past principles of liability amongst joint 
tortfeasors. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143 (1972). Specifically, in 
Dole, the common law in New York was changed to allow a defendant to seek 
contribution from other tortfeasors. Id. at 147. Thus, liability could be 
apportioned amongst everyone responsible for the damages attained, based 
upon their equitable share of liability. Id. at 153. A named defendant was 
afforded the right to implead other parties or bring a separate action against 
them for contribution, even if they had not been named in the original action 
by the plaintiff. Id. at 148. Upon the Court’s direction of Dole, a named 
defendant had expressive rights to apportionment, which would not hinge 
upon the “active” negligence of another, and even a claim of partial liability to 
another party would be sufficient for the defendant’s invocation of an 
15
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malpractice,111 legislative reapportionment,112 and the 
requirement for Miranda warnings.113 Moreover, during 
Hopkins’s time on the appellate bench, society was also 
experiencing significant change with increasing unrest and 
violence that impacted judicial fluency.114 Hopkins observed 
that the unrest and violence within society included 
bombings,115 the hijacking of airplanes,116 the taking of 
 
impleader. Id. at 147. In 1974, the New York Legislature codified Dole, in 
Article 14 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
1401 (MCKINNEY 2012) (“[T]wo or more persons who are subject to liability 
for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful 
death, may claim contribution among them whether or not an action has been 
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the person from whom 
contribution is sought.”). 
111. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 
1970’s: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 17 (1986), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3836&context=lcp 
(“Modern times—beginning roughly in the 1960’s—witnessed liberalization of 
substantive standards and procedural rules governing medical malpractice 
cases. Substantively, the principal modifications involved negligence 
standards, particularly the elimination or relaxation of the locality rule, 
standards for informed consent, and the scope of the doctrine of respondent 
superior. Procedurally, the main alterations have been the elimination of 
charitable immunity, relaxation of the statute of limitations, . . . and the 
loosening of proof requirements . . . .”); Martin H. Redish, Legislative 
Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional 
Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 759-60 (1977). Between 1960-70, insurance 
rates for surgeons rose 949.2%; for non-surgical physicians, 540.8%; for 
hospitals, 262.7%. Id. In several states premiums rose 100% between 1974-75 
alone. Id. at 760. 
112. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the 
reapportionment of legislative districts was a justiciable question and not a 
political question, permitting federal courts to intervene and resolve 
reapportionment cases). 
113. In its seminal decision, Miranda v. Arizona, the United States 
Supreme Court established “procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Hence, where 
a criminal defendant is subjected to a custodial interrogation, before any 
questioning, the defendant must be warned that he has “a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.” Id.; see also discussion infra Part VI.B. 
114. See generally Hopkins, Judiciary Night, supra note 109. 
115. See, e.g., Thomas Buckley, Bomb in IND Car Kills Woman and 
Hurts 18 at 125th St. Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1960 (The Sunday Bomber set 
off a series of bombs in New York City subways and ferries killing one woman 
and injuring 51 other commuters.); Martin Arnold, F.B.I. Charges 4 With 8 
Bombings Here Since July, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1969 (Three men and a 
woman were charged with being left-radical terrorists who had set off bombs 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
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hostages, and even the kidnapping of a judge in a courtroom.117 
In response, Hopkins argued that courts must act as a 
balancing mechanism within the structure of an ever-changing 
society by deciding what is to be preserved, what is to be 
abandoned, and when changes are to be made in the law.118 
Throughout his career, Hopkins continually recited his 
philosophy that the law is a function of our ever-changing 
culture.119 
Hopkins also recognized the appropriate role of judges 
within society. In 1970, he recalled the insightful and 
discerning observations of Thornton Wilder in his book, The 
Ides of March, when describing the function of a judge within 
the community.120 In his article Judiciary Night, Hopkins 
quotes Wilder: “I must arrive at my decisions as though they 
were not subject to the comment of other men, as though no 
one were watching.”121 The importance of Wilder’s words to 
Hopkins cannot be overstated. In fact, he was known to carry 
those very words in his wallet at all times.122 For Hopkins, 
 
in eight major corporate and governmental structures in New York City.). 
116. See, e.g., Evan Buxbaum, Carol Cratty & Elise Labott, Suspect in 
1968 Hijacking at JFK is Captured, CNN.COM, (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/10/12/fugitive.arrested.hijacking (On 
November 24, 1968, four hijackers boarded a Pan Am flight out of New York’s 
John F. Kennedy Airport on a scheduled route to Puerto Rico and diverted it 
to Havana, Cuba.). 
117. See, e.g., Lawrence V. Cotj, The Facts Behind the Angela Davis 
Case, HUMAN EVENTS, June 17, 1972, available at 
http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/Articles/Angela%20Davis%20and%20La
rry%20Cott.pdf (On August 7, 1970, Harold Joseph Haley, superior court 
judge in Marin County, California, was taken hostage along with several 
others during a trial in his courtroom. Unfortunately, he was killed during 
the attempted escape of his captors.). 
118. Hopkins, Judiciary Night, supra note 109, at 59. 
119. See, e.g., MacCrate, supra note 7 (outlining Judge Hopkins’s 
philosophy on the law and how it influenced his judicial opinions); Hopkins, 
Judiciary Night, supra note 109, at 56. 
120. Hopkins, Judiciary Night, supra note 109, at 55 (quoting THORNTON 
WILDER, THE IDES OF MARCH (1948)). 
121. Id. 
122. Fitzpatrick & Sherlock, supra note 9, at 505. This article was 
written by Judge Hopkins’s legal secretary, John J. Sherlock, and a law 
intern in Judge Hopkins’s Chambers, Margaret Fitzpatrick. The article 
examined Hopkins’s methodical approach to judicial writing and identified 
five key stages. The five stages were assignment of the case, discussion, 
research, final analysis, and writing. In addition, the authors examined 
17
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“fairness” prevailed when he acted as a “balancing mechanism” 
and rendered decisions without the influence of external 
forces.123 Significantly, Hopkins understood the importance of 
explaining to society the underlying reasons for his judicial 
decisions and the role of the court in doing so.124 
 
B. Legal Scholarship 
 
Hopkins, arguably more than any other New York State 
judge, aside from Judge Benjamin Cardozo, published a 
significant body of jurisprudence.125 Through scholarly writing, 
Hopkins expounded a new philosophical viewpoint on the 
practice of law and judicial decision-making.126 He championed 
numerous scholarly articles that portended the development of 
criminal, tort, and commercial law.127 His scholarly 
contributions were most significant when the law brought 
uncertainty amongst practitioners, judges, and the public at 
large.128 Hopkins’s legal scholarship focused on the 
development of important legal principles designed to quell 
situations that frustrated and split the judiciary.129 
Similar to Judge Cardozo, the most illustrative pieces of 
Hopkins’s contributions to legal scholarship were best 
demonstrated by his articles relating to the court’s functioning 
power, role, and purpose.130 For example, in The Role of an 
Intermediate Appellate Court, Hopkins examined the function 
of the appellate courts and proposed reform that would help 
 
Hopkins’s decisions to demonstrate his talent for symbolism and for 
capturing the essence of a case in melodic passage. 
123. Judge Hopkins never allowed external political forces to influence 
his approach to judicial decision-making. Interview with Margaret Mary 
Fitzpatrick, Law Intern, Judge Hopkins’s Chambers, White Plains, N.Y. 
(Mar. 28, 2012). 
124. MacCrate, supra note 7, at 594 (“If we cannot explain the decision 
of a case based on a reason applicable to all similarly situated, we return to 
the caprice of the caliph who administers justice on the steps of the 
mosque.”). 
125. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 106. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. See, e.g., Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 106. 
130. See generally ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (2000). 
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promote a better understanding of both adjective and 
substantive law amongst practitioners, legislatures, and 
members of the bench.131 Hopkins suggested that the 
understanding of the appellate court’s functioning, and the 
relationship amongst the different levels of the court system, is 
critical to the progression of legal principles and to the 
adjudication of the cases that arise before the court.132 Hopkins 
explained that “a relationship must be established between the 
trial court and the appellate court, their roles to be defined in 
the process.”133 
Hopkins also emphasized that the appellate courts should 
be known to serve a dual role: “to assist the highest court in its 
ultimate determination by rendering thorough expositions of 
the relative merits of alternative solutions to novel or 
controversial questions of law; [and] to function as the court of 
last resort for the great majority of cases.”134 Hopkins believed 
that intermediate courts should play an instrumental role in 
the system’s functioning, and provide guidance on the 
development and decision-making “in accord with the existing 
law” set before it.135 He argued that the intermediate courts 
possessed a great deal of power in the progression of legal 
principles, as they can singlehandedly “effect change”136 to 
existing law, “make a direct appeal to the legislature for a 
change,”137 or prepare the highest court for its opinion on the 
matter.138 
Hopkins also argued that practitioners and members of the 
judiciary must be conscious of the powers wielded by appellate 
courts.139 Hopkins was sensitive to the fact that “the 
intermediate court may literally be the court of last resort . . . 
.”140 Thus, he reckoned that “a heavy responsibility is borne by 
 
131. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 
41. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 459-60. 
134. Id. at 459. 
135. Id. at 464. 
136. Id. at 466. 
137. Id. at 464. 
138. Id. at 477. 
139. Id. at 466-68. 
140. Id. at 470. 
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the intermediate court,” the gravity of which can only be 
appreciated if it is first understood to exist by those litigants 
laboring under it.141 Hopkins advocated for institutional 
changes within the judiciary, noting that intermediate courts 
must be given the ability to afford litigants proper review, and 
the mechanics, time, and patience to do so.142 He directed that 
“the nature of this obligation . . . suggests that a periodic 
reexamination of its role should be instituted, particularly with 
respect to the kinds of cases which it should review, the need 
for additional judges, or the innovation of other means of 
reducing the case load for the courts.”143 
Hopkins authored other articles addressing the appellate 
courts abilities and the appropriate reforms that would allow it 
to properly adjudicate the high influx of cases that it routinely 
decided. Of significance, Hopkins routinely focused his reform 
suggestions to help alleviate the pressures associated with the 
immense caseload that had been increasingly set before the 
appellate division over the years. Hopkins pointed out, in his 
publication Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on 
the Appellate Process, that some evolutions of judicial posture 
have reworked the flux of caseloads that have come across the 
appellate bench.144 Hopkins noted that “[t]he truth is that 
almost every ruling of a substantive character or even of a 
procedural step in a civil case is appealable as [a matter of 
right].”145 Hopkins was critical of the amount of appeals that 
have been allowed by the court, noting that the history of the 
court had not warranted such a trend.146 Hopkins observed that 
“the evolution of the right of appeal has followed a winding 
road.”147 He stated, “[i]n our zeal to shield individuals from the 
absolutism of the past, we have moved, I think, too far in the 
direction of giving to the litigants an uncontrolled right of 
appeal.”148 
 
141. Id. at 472. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 478. 
144. See Hopkins, Small Sparks, supra note 106, at 551. 
145. Id. at 554. 
146. See generally id at 552-56. 
147. Id. at 552. 
148. Id. at 556. 
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Although Hopkins was troubled by the scope and breadth 
of appellate review, he remained firm to the belief “that a duty 
[always] rests on the court to do justice.”149 As such, 
irrespective of historical traditions, Hopkins mandated that 
neither the courts approach nor its sensitivity to the interests 
laid before it should be hindered.150 He suggested multiple 
procedural modifications that may help streamline appeals, 
while maintaining the degree of judicial consideration afforded 
to appellate review.151 
Hopkins’s appreciation and concern of litigant rights, and 
the relationship between judiciaries was demonstrated by his 
legal scholarship relating to habeas corpus review.152 Hopkins’s 
publication, Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tensions 
Between State and Federal Courts, illustrates the 
confrontations generally assailed by claims arising under 
habeas petitions, and the dual functioning of federal and state 
courts in the adjudication of such matters.153 Hopkins observed 
the unsettling tension between the state and federal judiciary, 
explaining that “[a]ll of these grounds of tension are 
undoubtedly inherent in any setting which contemplates a 
coincidence of jurisdiction in separate court systems over the 
same subject matter.”154 He argued that many of the state’s 
procedures to review habeas matters were inadequate, which 
frustrated the process and compelled unnecessary evidentiary 
proceedings in federal court.155 Hopkins observed “[t]he truth is 
that federal intervention in state convictions has not led to a 
wholesale reversal of state convictions . . . . [b]ut the 
incorporation of federal constitutional protections into state 
criminal systems has unquestionably contributed . . . to the 
burden thrust upon the federal courts [more] than any other 
cause.”156 
 
 
149. Id. at 568. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 565-67. 
152. Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 106. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 665. 
155. Id. at 666. 
156. Id. at 666-67. 
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Although confrontation among state and federal courts 
may be inevitable, Hopkins promoted that, in the interest of 
the judiciary, both courts must recognize their shared duties 
and functions, and reflect upon the values in a constitutional 
scheme that “should[] not only be reconciled but also 
harmonized.”157 He suggested, among other things, that the 
“tension between the two systems can be lessened by [simply] 
opening the channels of communication.”158 In promoting 
communal progression, Hopkins stated that “[w]hile a period of 
adjustment is usually a period of tension, this is by no means 
inevitable. If the two systems are willing to recognize the 
appropriate function of each [other] and to make adjustments 
in response thereto, the underlying causes of frustration can be 
eliminated.”159 
In his publication, Fictions and the Judicial Process: A 
Preliminary Theory of Decision, Hopkins facilitated the 
progression of legal practice by providing practitioners with an 
in-depth view of the judicial decision making process.160 
Providing his insight from the bench, Hopkins explained that 
the court’s resolution of facts and law is not contingent upon a 
constant formula, and a continual flux of factors, including the 
techniques undertaken by the presiding judge, may alter a 
case’s outcome.161 He argued that all judicial decisions provide 
a gateway for the court to speak to those before it, the public at 
large, and to justify the court’s actions for further courts that 
may reflect upon it.162 
Hopkins also explained that all judicial opinions are 
influenced by prior events, and judges seek to rest their 
decisions upon “experience[s], expressed in common sayings, in 
doctrine, in precedent, or in statute[s].”163 Hopkins observed 
that courts are using resemblances to convey to “litigants and 
the public that his decision is just, since it follows learning 
expounded in another case so similar that the case before him 
 
157. Id. at 670. 
158. Id. at 674. 
159. Id. at 675. 
160. Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process, supra note 40. 
161. Id. at 2. 
162. Id. at 7. 
163. Id. 
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must be determined in the same way.”164 Hopkins stated that 
“[a]n opinion at least may divert the fire, or soothe the aroused 
litigant or public.”165 He explained that a judicial decision 
embodies the invocation of many techniques, some of which are 
unconsciously engaged.166 In this regard, the final resolution 
illuminates the judge’s reaction to the facts set before him, “a 
reaction which he translates into legal language.”167 
Hopkins’s legal scholarship has remained instructive to 
many members of the legal community. Josephine Y. King, 
Pace Law Professor, observed, “[h]is mark as a teacher leads 
me to the conclusion that while many have acclaimed Judge 
Hopkins as a judge’s judge and a lawyer’s lawyer, let it also be 
said, he is a scholar’s delight.”168 His contributions remain to 
guide judges, practitioners, and the public on judicial decision 
making and fundamental principles of law: “[b]y conscious or 
subconscious influence, the presence of this restraining power, 
aloof in the background, but none the less always in reserve, 
tends to stabilize, [influence,] and rationalize the . . . 
judgment[s], to infuse it with the glow of principle, to hold the 
standard aloft and visible for those who must run the race and 
keep the faith.”169 
 
VI. Representative Opinions 
 
A. Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
Hopkins authored many instructive criminal law and 
procedure opinions. His lead from the bench when dealing with 
complex criminal law issues was especially remarkable, 
considering that he was never a prosecutor or a seasoned 
criminal defense attorney.170 Hopkins handled few criminal law 
 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 8. 
166. Id. at 12. 
167. Id. at 16. 
168. King, supra note 9, at 17. 
169. KAUFMAN, supra note 130, at 210. 
170. Hopkins “had, however as a county judge, presided over many 
criminal trials. Some selected opinions serve to demonstrate that the lack of a 
broader criminal justice experience did not lessen his influence or 
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cases in private practice,171 but guided by his special sense and 
fairness to all parties, he authored significant judicial opinions 
relating to criminal proceedings, including the Miranda 
doctrine,172 an individual’s interest in the free exercise of 
religion,173 and the Fourth Amendment.174 
 
B. The Miranda Doctrine 
 
Four years after Hopkins’s appointment to New York’s 
Appellate Division, Second Department, the United States 
Supreme Court rendered its seminal opinion in Miranda v. 
Arizona.175 Hopkins was at the forefront of the development of 
Miranda jurisprudence. He demonstrated a keen sense of how 
the Miranda doctrine was to be applied, interpreted, and 
developed,176 particularly in cases involving juvenile 
 
contribution to that branch of the law.” Bellacosa, supra note 36, at 475. 
171. There are few cases traceable to where Hopkins served as legal 
counsel for criminal defendants. Nevertheless, his limited presence was still 
paramount with traces of success. For example, in People v. McDermott, 47 
N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (App. Div. 1944), the defendant was convicted of perjury in 
the first degree. Serving as the defendant’s appellate counsel, Hopkins 
attained a modification of the conviction on appeal, reducing the conviction to 
the crime of perjury in second degree. Id. 
172. See, e.g., discussion infra Part VI.B-C; People v. Parker, 442 
N.Y.S.2d 803 (App. Div. 1981); People v. Servidio, 433 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. 
Div. 1980); People v. Townsend, 320 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1971) (Hopkins, 
J., dissenting); People v. Swift, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 1969); In re 
William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1968). 
173. See, e.g., discussion infra Part VI.D; Gold v. McShane, 426 N.Y.S.2d 
504 (App. Div. 1980); La Rocca v. Lane, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (App. Div. 1975); 
People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 1966). 
174. See, e.g., discussion infra Part VI.E; People v. David L., 439 
N.Y.S.2d 152, 154 (App. Div. 1981) (Hopkins & Weinstein, JJ., dissenting); 
Barber v. Ruben, 424 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1980); People v. Iucci, 401 
N.Y.S.2d 823 (App. Div. 1978); People v. Correa, 392 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App. 
Div. 1977) (Hopkins, J., dissenting); People v. Ward, 178 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Co. 
Ct. 1958). 
175. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda v. Arizona was a 
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court which held that 
statements made by a defendant in response to interrogation by police while 
in custody will only be admissible at trial if shown that the police informed 
the defendant of the right to consult with an attorney and of the right against 
self-incrimination prior to questioning, and that these rights were understood 
by the defendant so as to be voluntarily waived. Id. 
176. Hopkins’s progression of the Miranda doctrine in relation to 
juvenile defendants’ has remained a continuum with the courts, and has been 
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defendants.177 
Hopkins believed that a juvenile’s privilege against self-
incrimination required enhanced protections beyond the 
mandates of Miranda.178 Hopkins was aware of the heightened 
prospect that juvenile suspects may relinquish their rights 
under police persuasion, and may likely be unaware of the 
significance of such a waiver. For example, in In re William L., 
Hopkins excluded a juvenile’s confession on due process 
grounds because of the youth’s aptitude and immaturity.179 
Even though the defendant was advised of his rights pursuant 
to Miranda, Hopkins recognized that the juvenile’s 
vulnerability needed to be protected by the presence of counsel, 
and only when in such presence of counsel could a fair 
interrogation proceed.180 He stated, “[t]he age and immaturity 
of the juvenile, both emotionally and intellectually, create the 
need for advice of counsel and his presence at the questioning 
 
implicitly followed by the United States Supreme Court on numerous 
occasions. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding that the 
totality of the circumstances determines whether a juvenile voluntarily and 
knowingly waived Miranda rights, which includes the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation, the juvenile's age, experience, education, 
background, intelligence, and whether they have the capacity to understand 
the nature of the warnings given); see also infra note 198 and accompanying 
text (discussing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding that 
age is a relevant factor in determining whether a suspect is “in custody”)). 
177. See, e.g., People v. Townsend, 320 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1971) 
(Hopkins, J., dissenting); In re William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1968). 
178. See Townsend, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 892. 
179. In re William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d at 220. In this case, a fourteen-year-
old boy was arrested for homicide following a gang fight. Id. The defendant 
had been awakened by police officers at 3:00 A.M. while at his residence. The 
juvenile was taken to the station, and questioned by four or five officers. Id. 
The juvenile’s mother was told that it was not a serious matter when he was 
detained and that he would be returned home within hours. Id. At the 
station, the juvenile was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda. Id. 
Subsequently, the juvenile confessed to the homicide and was charged. Id. 
Two hours later, his mother was informed of the charge. However, the 
juvenile’s mother was never advised of her son’s right to counsel or that he 
could have counsel appointed if she could not afford it. Id. at 221. 
180. Id. at 221. Hopkins argued that it was “almost self-evident” that a 
fourteen-year-old boy awakened by police officers at 3:00 A.M., taken to a 
police station, and questioned by four or five officers, “would scarcely be in a 
frame of mind capable of appreciating the nature and effect of the 
constitutional warnings given him before the questioning begins.” Id. 
25
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when charges of juvenile delinquency may ensue.”181 
Similarly, in People v. Townsend,182 Hopkins argued, in 
dissent, to exclude the written confession of a juvenile 
defendant on due process grounds relating to Miranda 
violations by state officers. In Townsend, a seventeen-year-old 
high school student, who lived with his parents, was indicted 
for murder.183 He voluntarily appeared at a police station.184 As 
a result of continuous questioning between 9 P.M. and 2:30 
A.M., the prosecution obtained three oral statements and one 
written statement from him.185 Following a Huntley hearing, 
the trial court ruled that the three oral statements would be 
suppressed because they required Miranda warnings, which 
had not been given to the defendant by police.186 Nevertheless, 
the lower court held that the written statement was still 
admissible.187 On appeal, Hopkins was troubled by the 
circumstances under which the police had procured the 
defendant’s statements,188 observing that the defendant’s 
mother had telephoned the precinct several times to inquire 
whether her son was there,189 but on each occasion, the desk 
officer had informed her that her son was not at the precinct.190 
In dissent, Hopkins concluded that, “the age of defendant, the 
conceded invalidity of the first three statements, the action of 
the police in sealing off defendant from his parents, viewed 
[under a totality of circumstances] deprived defendant of the 
fundamental safeguards of due process.”191 
 
181. Id. 
182. People v. Townsend, 320 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1971) (Hopkins, 
J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 891. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 892. Similar to In re William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 
1968), Hopkins was critical of potential police misconduct and disapproved of 
their efforts to conceal the defendant’s presence at the station, to deceive the 
family, and to obstruct the parent’s access to their seventeen-year old boy. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. (emphasis added). Hopkins’s desire for fairness was also evident 
in his dissenting opinion. On this point he stated that “the essential point is 
that defendant is entitled to fair treatment.” Id. He emphasized that fairness 
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The Court of Appeals later reversed the Appellate Division 
and unanimously adopted the due process rationale of 
Hopkins’s dissent against a no-opinion affirmance at the 
appellate division.192 Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld explicitly 
relied on Hopkins’s dissent which urged the reversal of 
defendant’s conviction.193 Chief Judge Fuld followed Hopkins’s 
rationale and expressively adopted his view that the 
circumstances under which the police had procured the 
defendant’s written statement, “viewed as a whole deprived 
[him] of the fundamental safeguards of due process . . . .”194 The 
rationale advanced by Hopkins in Townsend has continued to 
progress over time, making judicial consideration of the state’s 
denial of access to a defendant by family or counsel a 
significant factor in the Miranda analysis.195 
Aside from the express adoption of Hopkins’s Miranda 
rationale by the New York Court of Appeals in Townsend, it is 
noteworthy to mention that Hopkins’s application of the 
Miranda doctrine was and continues to be followed by many 
other courts. For example, his opinion in In re William L., in 
which Hopkins recognized that special problems may arise in 
the application of Miranda in the case of juveniles, was 
frequently cited in the evolution of the Miranda doctrine.196 
Courts relied on Hopkins’s guidance, and reaffirmed the 
application of procedural safeguards initiated to protect the 
 
was the initial and potentially the only issue to be addressed by stating, “We 
need go no further once unfair treatment is demonstrated.” Id. 
192. People v. Townsend, 300 N.E. 722, 724 (N.Y. 1973). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. The Court of Appeals precluded the use of the written statement 
obtained in violation of Miranda and reversed the defendant’s conviction. Id. 
195. See, e.g. People v. Anderson, 364 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (N.Y. 1977) 
(citing Townsend, 300 N.E.2d 722) (holding that the incommunicado nature 
of the defendant’s confinement is to be weighed in the scales). 
196. In re Carlos P., the court reaffirmed that 
 
[I]f counsel was not present for some permissible reason 
when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be 
taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the 
sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also 
that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of 
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. 
 
681 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (Bronx Co. 1998). 
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rights of juvenile defendants, echoing Hopkins’s initial 
observation that “the emotional and intellectual immaturity of 
a juvenile creates an obvious need for the advice of a loyal 
guardian and counsel at an interrogation from which charges of 
juvenile delinquency may ensue.”197 
Significantly, Hopkins’s approach in the application of 
Miranda rights to juveniles in both Townsend and In re 
William L. has also been recently bolstered by the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
which held that juveniles enjoy expanded Miranda 
protection.198 The Supreme Court held, in a rare expansion of 
Miranda rights,199 that law enforcement must consider a 
suspect’s age when deciding whether to provide a Miranda 
warning.200 The Court reasoned that “commonsense reality” is 
“that children will often feel bound to submit to police 
questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would 
feel free to leave.”201 The Court, implicitly following Hopkins’s 
 
197. Michelet P. v. Gold, 419 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707 (App. Div. 1979) 
(involving a fifteen-year-old who made inculpatory statements during the 
course of police questioning in a murder investigation). The court reaffirmed 
that “the requirement to notify a party legally responsible for the juvenile is 
strict.” Id. (citing In re William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d 218, 221 (App. Div. 1968)); 
see also In re Candy M., 538 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Ulster Co. Fam. Ct. 1989) (citing 
In re William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d at 221). 
198. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). In this case, a 
thirteen-year-old seventh grader was a suspect in several home break-ins. Id. 
at 2399. A police investigator took J.D.B. from his classroom and brought him 
to a school conference room for interrogation. Id. The officer did advise J.D.B. 
of his right to remain silent as instructed by the Miranda doctrine. Id. 
Thereafter, the investigator, accompanied by a school resource officer and two 
school administrators, questioned J.D.B. for thirty to forty-five minutes. Id. 
During the interrogation, they warned J.D.B. that he should “do the right 
thing,” and if not, he faced the possibility of “juvenile detention.” Id. at 2399-
400. J.D.B. ultimately confessed that he and a friend had broken into the 
homes. Id. at 2400. North Carolina courts held that J.D.B. was not in custody 
during the interrogation, and therefore no Miranda warning was necessary. 
Id. 
199. Compare Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 667 (2004) 
(defining “custody” and discussing the influence of youthfulness on whether a 
“reasonable person” would feel free to leave), with Fare v. Michael C., 442 
U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979) (validating an adult standard of knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances to evaluate the 
legitimacy of a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda rights). 
200. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399. 
201. Id. at 2398-99. 
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lead in In re William L., stated it is “self-evident to anyone who 
was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge” 
that a child is more likely to feel pressed by the demands of 
adult authority figures.202 Thus, the early guidelines 
established by Hopkins’s application of the Miranda doctrine 
were ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court’s direction that a 
child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.203 
 
C. Development of Miranda 
 
Hopkins’s commitment to the Miranda doctrine was not 
limited only to juveniles.204 For example, in People v. Parker,205 
Hopkins protected the need for “frank communication” in the 
parolee-parole officer relationship by mandating that a parole 
officer give Miranda warnings in certain situations.206 Writing 
for a unanimous Appellate Division, Hopkins held that a parole 
officer must give Miranda warnings to a parolee when the 
parolee’s statements are to be used against him in a criminal 
proceeding outside the structure of the parole system.207 
Hopkins recognized the parolee’s dilemma and the sensitive 
issues at stake.208 He explained that on one hand, the parolee 
 
202. Id. at 2403 (emphasis added). 
203. Id. at 2399 (“Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind 
themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly 
informs the Miranda custody analysis.”). 
204. See, e.g., People v. Parker, 422 N.Y.S.2d 803 (App. Div. 1981); 
People v. Servidio, 433 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 1980); People v. Swift, 300 
N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 1969). 
205. 442 N.Y.S.2d 803. In Parker, the defendant was arrested on charges 
of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, assault in the second 
degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree. Id. at 804. The defendant 
informed his parole officer that he had been arrested. Id. The parole officer 
asked the defendant about the circumstances of the arrest. Id. However, the 
parole officer did not inform the defendant of his rights under Miranda. Id. 
The grand jury failed to return an indictment and the defendant’s case was 
dismissed. Id. at 805. After the dismissal, the parole officer again asked the 
defendant about the circumstances of his arrest. Id. at 804. Again, no 
Miranda warnings were administered. Id. Subsequently, the parole officer 
notified the District Attorney of the defendant’s inculpatory statement and 
testified before the grand jury. Id. As a result, the grand jury indicted the 
defendant for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Id. 
206. Id. at 807. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 806. 
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must truthfully reveal the circumstances underlying his arrest 
or face the consequence of parole revocation.209 On the other 
hand, the parolee risks conviction because his statements could 
be used against him in a prosecution.210 To reconcile this 
dilemma, Hopkins stressed the importance of “frank 
communication[s]” in the parolee-supervisor relationship,211 
noting that the “relationship will be damaged beyond repair if 
the indispensable pillar of candid exchange is undermined.”212 
Although a string of Hopkins’s Miranda opinions implicitly 
stress the fostering of rights afforded to the accused in 
investigative settings,213 he also, at times, recognized and 
appreciated the competing interests at stake for state actors.214 
 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 807. 
212. Id. (emphasis added). Throughout, Hopkins’s tenure on the bench, 
he repeatedly used analogies to support, strengthen, and justify his position. 
See, e.g., Angelo v. Angelo, 428 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (App. Div. 1980) (“Each case 
must be decided on its own facts, and the court should not be fettered in 
achieving an equitable apportionment of assets on the dissolution of a 
marriage by the iron clasp of a mechanical formula.”); Siegel v. Kranis, 288 
N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (App. Div. 1968) (“The author of the disaster should not be 
enabled to chart the strategy to avoid the liability for his own negligence.”); 
People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (App. Div. 1966), (“[T]he fabric of 
society might be pierced and fatally rent by a religious belief sincerely held by 
an individual in action or in non-action damaging to the continuing existence 
of peace and order in the community.”); see also Fitzpatrick & Sherlock, supra 
note 9, at 502. 
213. See, e.g., In re William L., 287 N.Y.S.2d 218, 221 (App. Div. 1968) 
(Hopkins excluded a juvenile’s confession on due process grounds); People v. 
Townsend, 320 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div. 1971) (Hopkins, J., dissenting) 
(Hopkins excluded the written confession a of seventeen year-old juvenile on 
due process grounds); People v. Parker, 442 N.Y.S.2d 803, 807 (App. Div. 
1981) (Hopkins protected the need for “frank communication” in the parolee-
parole officer relationship by mandating that a parole officer give Miranda 
warnings in certain situations). 
214. Hopkins always acknowledged the role of the court in balancing the 
defendant’s interest against the state’s interest in operating an effective 
police system to fight crime. See, e.g., People v. Servidio, 433 N.Y.S.2d 169, 
173 (App. Div. 1980) (declining the opportunity to add a further inquiry to the 
Miranda warnings that would have required law enforcement to obtain 
information from the defendant as to the existence of other pending charges); 
People v. Swift, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639, 644 (App. Div. 1969) (speaking for a 
unanimous court, Hopkins held that law enforcement do not have to quote 
the exact words of the Miranda decision). 
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For example, in People v. Servidio,215 Hopkins declined the 
opportunity to add a further inquiry to the Miranda warnings 
that would have required law enforcement to obtain 
information from the defendant as to the existence of other 
pending charges.216 Hopkins held that statements made by a 
defendant in custody, in the absence of an attorney 
representing him on a pending unrelated charge, are 
admissible provided there was no showing that the police 
officers taking the statements knew that the defendant was 
represented by counsel on such unrelated charges.217 The Court 
of Appeals has relied on Servidio, stating “the ‘strict liability’ 
rule for which defendant argued would tax law enforcement 
officials anywhere with knowledge of accusatory instruments 
on unrelated charges everywhere, and unnecessarily and 
unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.”218 
In Servidio, Hopkins was clearly aware of the state’s 
interest and reasoned that there was no compelling purpose to 
impose a further burden on the police to investigate court 
records for pending cases within the jurisdiction.219 He 
observed that the defendant is best fit to know of a pending 
case against him and can readily inform the police at the time 
of questioning.220 The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed 
Hopkins’s decision.221 Indeed, Justice Matthew Jasen expressly 
concurred with the majority’s opinion “for the reasons stated in 
the opinion by Justice JAMES D. HOPKINS at the Appellate 
Division.”222 Remarkably, the Court of Appeals adoption of 
 
215. 433 N.Y.S.2d 169. In Servidio, the defendant was indicted for 
burglary and grand larceny. Id. at 170. Following his apprehension, the 
defendant was read his Miranda rights and waived them. Id. Afterwards, he 
made a number of incriminating statements. Id. At the time of his arrest and 
questioning, an attorney was representing the defendant in an unrelated 
matter. Id. at 171. The defendant argued that his statements to the police 
should be suppressed because the attorney representing him on the pending 
unrelated charges was absent. Id. 
216. Id. at 173. 
217. Id. at 170. 
218. People v. Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d 45, 48-49 (N.Y. 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
219. See Servidio, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 173. 
220. Id. 
221. People v. Servidio, 429 N.E.2d 821 (N.Y. 1981). 
222. Id. at 823 (Jasen, J., concurring). 
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Hopkins’s legal rationale, as demonstrated in Servidio, 
remained at a continuum amongst members of the New York 
Court of Appeals. As Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa once 
pronounced, “Judge Hopkins’[s] commendations were unique 
and exceptional in that adoption of his judicial products were 
more numerous and more consistent than for any other lower 
court judge.”223 
Similarly, in People v. Swift,224 Hopkins also applied a 
sensible, pragmatic, and rational approach in order to avoid 
placing a judicial saddle upon law enforcement officials. 
Writing for a unanimous court, Hopkins declared that law 
enforcement does not have to quote the exact words of the 
proposed Miranda warning when conducting an 
interrogation.225 However, he cautioned that the substance of 
the warnings must be “imparted in a manner which would be 
understandable by the ordinary person.”226 
Notably, Hopkins arrived at his decision in Swift only 
three years after Miranda, and as Chief Judge Grimes 
acknowledged,227 the United States Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion some twelve years later in California v. 
Prysock.228 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has on 
two further occasions, one as recent as 2010, implicitly 
reaffirmed Hopkins’s innovative application of the Miranda 
doctrine.229 
 
223. See Bellacosa, supra note 36, at 463. 
224. 300 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 1969). 
225. Id. at 644. 
226. Id. 
227. See Grimes, supra note 6, at 522. Chief Justice of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, William Grimes, reviewed numerous opinions 
that Hopkins wrote in the area of criminal law and procedure. In conclusion, 
Chief Justice Grimes wrote, “[r]eading through his opinions has made me 
even more aware than I was before of the greatness of this man, who has 
given so much of his life to the cause of justice . . . .” Id. at 534. 
228. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981) (holding that no 
“talismanic incantation” is required for the Miranda warnings as long as 
rights are adequately conveyed, so that the reference to the right to 
appointed counsel is not “linked with some future point in time after the 
police interrogation”). 
229. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that police officers do not have to 
use the specific language of the Miranda decision so long as they reasonably 
conveyed to suspects their constitutional rights); Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 
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D. Free Exercise of Religion 
 
Hopkins believed that judicial proceedings should be 
neutral, fair, and untainted by external forces, even if that 
required certain restrictions on an individual’s right to free 
exercise of religion.230 Hopkins argued that “the amendments 
in the Bill of Rights are not all of equal value—some, like the 
[F]irst [Amendment], are preferred, but not always.”231 
Hopkins’s opinion in La Rocca v. Lane232 was a classic 
example of his unwavering efforts to maintain the integrity of 
the judicial process. Hopkins determined that an attorney, who 
was also a Catholic priest, had to remove his clerical garb when 
appearing before a jury during criminal proceedings on behalf 
of his client.233 Specifically, the attorney, who had represented 
the defendant in the underlying proceeding, had argued that 
his First Amendment rights had been violated when the lower 
court mandated removal of his religious garments.234 Rejecting 
this argument, Hopkins concluded that the State’s interest in 
ensuring a fair trial outweighed the petitioner’s right to free 
exercise of religion.235 
In La Rocca, Hopkins underscored that one’s right to a fair 
trial is of monumental significance to the backdrop of our 
jurisprudence, and explained that the court should take action 
to regulate the attire of an attorney when there is “a 
discernible nexus between dress of an attorney and the 
attainment of a fair trial.”236 Hopkins stressed that the judicial 
process must “envelop” all who appear in court and that society 
“must be aware of the court’s interest in conducting a fair and 
impartial trial.”237 
 
1195 (2010) (Justice Ginsburg stated that to determine whether police 
warnings are satisfactory, the inquiry is simply whether the warnings 
reasonably conveyed to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda). 
230. See, e.g., La Rocca v. Lane, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (App. Div. 1975); 
People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 1966). 
231. Hopkins, Judiciary Night, supra note 109, at 58. 
232. 366 N.Y.S.2d 456. 
233. Id. at 465. 
234. Id. at 459. 
235. Id. at 465. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
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Additionally, Hopkins stressed that an attorney’s right to 
his or her exercise of religious beliefs was subject to reasonable 
regulation when advocating before the tribunal.238 Hopkins 
emphasized the broad discretionary powers of a judge in 
regulating the courtroom.239 Although granting such discretion, 
Hopkins cautioned that the court could not unreasonably 
exercise its discretionary power.240 He noted, “whether counsel 
preferred a bow-tie to a four-in-hand, or a gray suit to a blue, in 
common experience should have no influence on the conduct of 
a trial.”241 The New York State Court of Appeals later affirmed 
Hopkins’s decision242 in a six-to-one opinion.243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238. Id. at 461. 
239. See id. at 462. 
240. See id. at 465. 
241. Id. 
242. La Rocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975). Remarkably, despite 
the Appellate Division’s holding and the Court of Appeals’ strong affirmance, 
in People v. Rodriguez, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1979), a New York 
Supreme Court Judge rejected overwhelming precedent and held that 
prohibiting attorney/priest La Rocca from wearing his clerical garb in court 
violated his constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. The lower 
court reasoned that a properly conducted voir dire of a jury, to eliminate juror 
bias and ensure a fair trial, was a sufficient and viable alternative to the 
forced removal of the clerical garb. See id. at 604-08. Nonetheless, in Gold v. 
McShane, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 1980), the Appellate Division 
overturned Rodriguez, holding that the Court of Appeals’ decision in La 
Rocca was dispositive of the issue, and publically reprimanded the Supreme 
Court Judge responsible for the decision. In a Memorandum in which 
Hopkins concurred, the Appellate Division stated that, “[i]t was 
inappropriate for Justice McShane to review the decision of another Judge of 
coordinate jurisdiction. Furthermore, we find no change in circumstances 
that should have led Justice McShane to hold contrary to LaRocca [sic] v. 
Lane. . . . The decision of the Court of Appeals in that case continues to be 
dispositive of this issue.” Id. at 505. 
243. La Rocca, 338 N.E.2d 606 (Chief Judge of the New York State 
Court of Appeals, Charles D. Breitel, writing for the majority, held that the 
interest in according a criminal defendant and the state a fair trial 
outweighed any limitation on the priest’s freedom of religion). 
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Similarly, in People v. Woodruff,244 Hopkins balanced the 
petitioner’s right to exercise religious beliefs against the State’s 
interest in conducting criminal proceedings.245 Hopkins held 
that the individual’s right to free exercise of religion must give 
way to the interest of the State in maintaining peace and 
order.246 Hopkins observed the responsibility owed by each 
member of society to testify before the grand jury, to assist 
with the investigation of a crime, and to ensure that the 
punishment of crimes is effectuated.247 Hopkins stated that 
“the fabric of society might be pierced and fatally rent by a 
religious belief sincerely held by an individual in action or in 
non-action damaging to the continuing existence of peace and 
order in the community.”248 
 
E. Search & Seizure 
 
Hopkins’s sense of fairness and his desire for justice in 
judicial proceedings was evident in his Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.249 In Barber v. Rubin, the petitioner had been 
indicted for second-degree murder.250 Significantly, the 
murdered victim’s clenched fist contained a number of human 
hairs.251 “The Supreme Court . . . [had] granted an order 
 
244. 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 1966). In Woodruff, the defendant 
appeared before the grand jury and refused, despite her immunity, to answer 
questions concerning the use and possession of narcotics by residents of the 
Castalia Foundation. Id. at 787. She based her refusal chiefly on her rights 
under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and the State 
Constitution. Id. She argued that answering the questions would violate the 
principles of her religious belief because her testimony would tend to bring 
harm to others. Id. at 787-88. 
245. Id. at 789. 
246. Id. 
247. See id. 
248. Id. at 790. 
249. See, e.g., People v. David L., 439 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154 (App. Div. 1981) 
(Hopkins & Weinstein, JJ., dissenting); Barber v. Rubin, 424 N.Y.S.2d 453 
(App. Div. 1980); People v. Iucci, 401 N.Y.S.2d 823 (App. Div. 1978); People v. 
Correa, 392 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App. Div. 1977) (Hopkins, J., dissenting), 
rev’d, 391 N.E.2d 1363 (N.Y. 1979) (the Court of Appeals adopting Judge 
Hopkins’s dissenting memorandum); People v. Ward, 178 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Co. 
Ct. 1958). 
250. 424 N.Y.S.2d at 454. 
251. Id. 
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permitting a physician to extract hairs, including roots, from 
the petitioner’s head, for use as specimens to determine 
whether the hairs found in the victim’s hand had come from 
the petitioner.”252 The petitioner sought to prohibit the 
enforcement of the Supreme Court’s order.253 The Appellate 
Division remitted the application for an evidentiary hearing 
“probing the necessity of the procedure for the removal of the 
hair, the degree of the invasion into the petitioner’s body, the 
degree of harm to which the petitioner might be exposed, and 
the probative value of the evidence sought.”254 The principal 
issue was whether a physician should be permitted to extract 
hairs, including roots, from the petitioner’s head, for use as 
specimens to determine whether the hairs found in the victim’s 
hand had come from the petitioner.255 The petitioner contended 
that the removal of the hair would violate his constitutional 
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.256 Writing 
for the majority, Hopkins determined that the physician should 
be allowed to extract the petitioner’s hair.257 
Hopkins determined that sufficient facts demonstrating 
necessity and probable cause had been established to allow 
such extraction.258 He reasoned that “[t]he petitioner [would] 
not be subjected to either an unnecessary exposure of harm or 
an impermissible invasion of his person.”259 Barber was 
significant because it illustrated Hopkins’s willingness to 
accept novel, creative, and fair investigative techniques. 
Several of Hopkins’s dissenting opinions also demonstrated 
the significance of his Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as 
such opinions were later adopted by the New York Court of 
Appeals and remain good law. For example, in People v. Correa, 
Hopkins contended that probable cause existed for the police to 
search the defendant’s bag.260 In Correa, an anonymous 
 
252. Id. at 454-55. 
253. Id. at 455. 
254. Id. 
255. See id. at 456. 
256. Id. at 455. 
257. Id. at 458. 
258. Id. at 457. 
259. Id. at 455. 
260. 392 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App. Div. 1979) (Hopkins, J., dissenting). 
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telephone caller had informed the police that a man wearing a 
red shirt and blue dungarees was carrying a green bag that 
contained a shotgun.261 In addition, the anonymous caller had 
given the individual’s location.262 Hopkins reasoned that the 
“combination” of the defendant’s attire and his location was 
“unique.”263 Hopkins found the officer’s minimal intrusion into 
the privacy of the defendant to be justified.264 Accordingly, the 
officer was entitled to open the defendant’s bag because he 
asked for permission to have the bag and, more significantly, 
had felt a hard object in the bag that resembled a rifle.265 The 
Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate Division 
for the “reasons stated in the dissenting memorandum by Mr. 
Justice James D. Hopkins at the Appellate Division.”266 
Similarly, in People v. David L., Hopkins dissented from 
his colleagues, who held that police officers could not open the 
door of a motor vehicle during the course of an investigation 
following a legal stop of a vehicle.267 Hopkins concluded that 
the mere opening of the door was not an unreasonable 
search.268 He advanced that the opening of the door of the 
vehicle would reduce the risk that the officer would be killed or 
injured from the use of a gun by the passenger.269 Hopkins 
reasoned that “the expectations of privacy of a passenger of an 
automobile fall considerably below the expectations of privacy 
of an occupant of a dwelling.”270 He also explained that 
defendant’s privacy interest was diminished by the fact that he 
 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See id. 
265. Id. 
266. People v. Correa, 391 N.E.2d 1363, 1363 (N.Y. 1979). 
267. 439 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154 (App. Div. 1981) (Hopkins & Weinstein, JJ., 
dissenting). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. Judge Hopkins advanced his position as set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977). The 
Supreme Court recognized the inherent dangers imposed upon a police officer 
when approaching a person seated inside an automobile. Id. The Supreme 
Court pointed out that the statistics of police homicides indicate that, “a 
significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers 
are making traffic stops.” Id. 
270. David L., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 154. 
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was not the owner or operator of the vehicle.271 Hopkins relied 
upon United States Supreme Court precedent272 and the Court 
of Appeals later “reversed for reasons stated in the dissenting 
memorandum by former Justice James D. Hopkins.”273 
Hopkins’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also focused 
heavily upon protecting the state’s fundamental interest of 
investigating, prosecuting, and preventing crime.274 For 
example, in People v. Abruzzi, Hopkins argued that the 
exclusionary rule should only exclude evidence of past 
crimes.275 Hopkins observed that the exclusionary rule should 
not close “the eyes and mouth of a police officer who sees a 
crime committed in his presence, even though he is there 
illegally.”276 Hopkins acknowledged the role of the court in 
balancing the defendant’s interest in a fair trial against the 
State’s interest in operating an effective and efficient law 
enforcement system to fight crime.277 He advanced that “[e]ven 
though the acts of the defendant were observed by the police 
investigator in the course of an illegal search, the acts 
constituted, in themselves, an independent crime concerning 
 
271. Id. at 155. 
272. See id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)). In Rakas, 
Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for the majority, narrowed the 
“legitimately on the property” argument for challenging the legality of a 
police search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 147-48. Justice Rehnquist held that a 
defendant must show a “legitimate” expectation of privacy in the place 
searched in order to be eligible to challenge the search. Id. 
273. People v. David L., 436 N.E.2d 1324, 1324 (N.Y. 1982). 
274. See, e.g., David L., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 154 (Hopkins determined that 
police officers could open the door of a motor vehicle during the course of an 
investigation following a legal stop of a vehicle); Barber v. Rubin, 424 
N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1980) (Hopkins determined that a physician should 
be allowed to extract a suspect’s hair for forensic analysis); People v. Correa, 
392 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App. Div. 1979) (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (Hopkins 
contended that probable cause existed for the police to search the defendant’s 
bag based on an anonymous tip). 
275. 385 N.Y.S.2d 94, 100 (App. Div. 1976) (Hopkins, J. dissenting). In 
Abruzzi, women patients had complained of a doctor’s sexual misconduct 
during gynecological examinations. Id. at 95-96. A police officer, without a 
warrant, used a seven-foot ladder to see through a curtained window of the 
doctor’s examination room. Id. at 96. The officer witnessed the doctor 
performing acts of sexual misconduct. Id. The majority held that the evidence 
was inadmissible on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. at 98. 
276. Id. at 100. 
277. See id. at 99. 
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which the observations of the officer were legal evidence.”278 
Although Abruzzi was affirmed on appeal, Hopkins dissenting 
opinion did get an endorsement from some members of the New 
York Court of Appeals, including Judge Jasen, who proclaimed, 
“I also agree with so much of the dissenting opinion by Mr. 
Justice James D. Hopkins at the Appellate Division as states 
that the doctrine of the taint of the poisonous tree should not 
be extended to include evidence of the personal observation by 
a police officer of a crime committed in his presence.”279 
 People v. Iucci280 also illustrated Hopkins’s willingness to 
address both the prosecution’s and the defendant’s interests. 
Hopkins concurred with the defendant’s argument and a lower 
court’s determination that a twenty-nine day delay in sealing 
eavesdropping tapes rendered the evidence of eavesdropping 
tapes inadmissible against the defendants at trial.281 In 
addition to challenging the admissibility of the tapes, the 
defendants had moved to suppress evidence obtained under a 
subsequent search warrant.282 Hopkins determined that the 
subsequent search warrant, based on information obtained 
 
278. Id. at 98. 
279. People v. Abruzzi, 364 N.E.2d 1342, 1342 (N.Y. 1977). 
280. 401 N.Y.S.2d 823 (App. Div. 1978). The New York Supreme Court 
authorized a wiretap on Irving Moss’s telephone. Id. at 825. During the 
period of the eavesdropping warrant, police officers overheard a number of 
conversations between Geritano and Paul Moss. Id. Apparently, the 
conversations revealed that Geritano and Paul Moss had installed an illegal 
wiretap on Ann Basciano’s telephone. Id. A police detective and a telephone 
company agent subsequently established that an unauthorized wire had been 
attached to Basciano’s telephone and that the wire ran to Iucci’s apartment. 
Id. at 825-26. Based on the detective’s affidavit, the Supreme Court issued a 
warrant to search Iucci’s apartment. Id. at 826. When the search warrant 
was executed, the illegal tap, electronic equipment, and a rifle were 
discovered. Id. at 826. However, the police did not seal the Moss 
eavesdropping tapes until twenty-nine days after the expiration of the 
eavesdropping warrant. Id. Criminal Term held that the twenty-nine day 
delay in sealing the tapes violated the statutory requirement that they be 
sealed immediately upon the expiration of the warrant. Id. As a result, 
Criminal Term concluded that all communications and evidence derived from 
the Moss wiretap had to be suppressed. Id. “Moreover, Criminal Term held 
that as the search warrant was based partially on the suppressed 
communications, and other independent information sufficient to represent 
probable cause did not exist, the evidence seized under the search warrant 
must likewise be suppressed as fruits of the tainted source.” Id. 
281. Id. at 828. 
282. Id. at 825. 
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under the eavesdropping warrant, and the evidence derived 
from the warrant, were not contaminated by the failure to seal 
the tapes promptly.283 Hopkins relied on the fact that the 
defendant’s illegal wiretap was in plain sight on the telephone 
company’s property and could easily have been discovered 
without the information obtained under the eavesdropping 
warrant.284 Furthermore, Hopkins reasoned that the presence 
of the illegal wiretap, once discovered, was sufficient grounds to 
justify the issuance of the warrant for the defendant’s 
apartment.285 
 
VII. CPLR: Statutory Interpretation 
 
One year after Hopkins’s appointment to the Supreme 
Court Appellate Division for the Second Department, the Civil 
Practice Laws and Rules (“CPLR”) became effective.286 The new 
practice rules codified significant case law developments and 
set forth new procedures to be interpreted and applied by the 
New York Judiciary.287 The task of recasting civil liability in 
the context of liberalized adjective law was placed primarily 
upon the statewide appellate divisions.288 Hopkins was one of 
 
283. Id. Hopkins showed a strong respect for stare decisis in reaching 
his conclusion that the search warrant and the evidence derived from the 
search were not “fatally infected” by the police’s failure to seal the tapes. See 
id. at 828-29. 
284. Id. at 829. 
285. Id. Evidently, Hopkins did not alter his approach, even from when 
he served on the Westchester County Court. For example, in People v. Ward, 
178 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Co. Ct. 1958), Hopkins concluded that the results of the 
defendant’s blood alcohol content should not have been admitted into 
evidence at his trial. Id. at 709. Hopkins reasoned that proper protocol had 
not been followed when the defendant’s arm had been swabbed with alcohol 
as an antiseptic prior to the extraction of the blood. See id. at 708-09. 
Consequently, it was “possible” that the alcohol used as an antiseptic might 
have entered the blood withdrawn from the defendant’s arm and 
contaminated the result of the blood test. Id. at 709. In this regard, Iucci and 
Ward signify that in the interest of fairness Hopkins was willing to exclude 
evidence pivotal to the prosecution of the accused when law enforcement 
failed to follow standard operating procedures. 
286. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 2 (5th ed. 2011) (The 
CPLR became effective on September 1, 1963). 
287. Id. at 3. 
288. Id. at 6-7. 
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the preeminent justices entrusted with this task.289 He 
confronted new statutory law involving questions of joint 
tortfeasors, contribution, impleader, indemnity, comparative 
negligence, statutes of limitations, long arm jurisdiction, 
pleading, res judicata, and other challenges.290 Hopkins 
developed the “continuing legal representation doctrine,”291 
decided the accrual date for the statute of limitations in 
contribution and indemnity actions,292 and rendered significant 
res judicata decisions.293 These and other decisions by Hopkins 
will be featured in the following section. 
 
A. Statute of Limitations 
 
In Cubito v. Kreisberg,294 Hopkins decided the accrual date 
on a plaintiff’s claim for negligent design against an 
architect.295 The architect moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
action on statute of limitations grounds because more than four 
years had passed from the date when the defendant had 
delivered the certificate of final inspection to the owner of the 
building.296 
Rejecting this defense, Hopkins held that the statute of 
limitation runs from the date of the injury, not from the date of 
delivery of the certificate of final inspection.297 Hopkins 
explained that although the accrual date was not established 
by legislative expression, it would be absurd to extinguish a 
claim for an injury before the accident ever occurred in the first 
place.298 Hopkins recognized the implications that his decision 
 
289. See discussion supra Part VII.A-C; see also King, supra note 4. 
290. See King, supra note 4. 
291. See discussion infra Part VII.A. 
292. See discussion infra Part VII.A. 
293. See King, supra note 4. 
294. 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div. 1979). On October 6, 1977, the plaintiff 
brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on the 
defendant architect’s negligent design of the laundry room, causing water to 
collect on the floor, which plaintiff claims caused the fall and resulting 
injuries. Id. at 579. 
295. Id. at 583. 
296. Id. at 579. 
297. Id. 
298. See id. at 583. 
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would have on the interplay between the judiciary and the 
State legislature, and expressly deferred to the legislature 
upon whether arbitrary time limits in statues of repose should 
be enacted thereafter.299 In the meantime, Hopkins reasoned 
that since the legislature had not defined the term “accrual” he 
was free to do so in the most reasonable manner.300 Thus, he 
adopted a date of injury accrual, which has been followed by 
courts in New York State.301 
In Musco v. Conte,302 Hopkins was confronted with the 
issue of when a cause of action for indemnity accrued.303 The 
defendant served a third party complaint nearly five years 
after the action was started against him, and the third party 
defendant argued the three year statute of limitations ran from 
the plaintiff’s injury.304 If this argument were accepted, a 
defendant who failed to quickly implead other possible 
tortfeasors would lose his or her indemnification action. 
Hopkins was charged with the task of clarifying this new area 
of the law, which had not been statutorily resolved. Hopkins 
explained: 
 
An action for indemnity need not take the form of 
third-party relief; it may be brought as an 
independent action subsequent to the rendition 
of judgment against a tortfeasor. The  general 
 
299. See id. 
300. See id. at 581. 
301. IFD Constr. Corp. v. Corddry Carpenter Dietz & Zack, 685 N.Y.S.2d 
670 (App. Div. 1999). 
 
[I]n the context of a personal injury action against a design 
professional by a party who did not retain the design 
professional, the cause of action accrues on the date of 
injury, the date when, as the Court of Appeals has noted, 
the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the 
tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint. 
 
Id. at 672 (citing Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 615 N.E.2d 999 (N.Y. 
1993)); Cubito v. Kreisberg, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 415 
N.E.2d 979 (N.Y. 1980)). 
302. 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 1964). 
303. Id. at 592. 
304. See id. 
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rule is established that the action accrues not at 
the time of the commission of the tort for which 
indemnity is sought, but at the time of the 
payment of the judgment; and its rule applies as 
well to third-party complaints.305 
 
The “Hopkins Impleader Accrual Rule” is applicable for 
indemnification and contribution claims and the statutory time 
period for both claims is six years.306 Musco has been followed 
by courts throughout New York and remains good law.307 
In Siegel v. Kranis, three members of a family were injured 
in an automobile accident.308 The attorney hired by the 
plaintiffs filed an untimely claim and was sued for 
malpractice.309 Defendant moved to dismiss the claim on the 
grounds that his failure to file the claim occurred more than six 
years prior to the malpractice claim.310 Hopkins, in an issue of 
first impression, reasoned that the continuous treatment 
exception formulated by the New York Court of Appeals in 
Borgia v. City of New York311 appeared equally applicable in 
the context of litigation by attorneys.312 Hopkins stated: 
 
 
305. Id. at 595 (citations omitted). 
306. See id. 
307. See, e.g., Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co. v. Canter, No. 07 
Civ. 5599(PKL), 2009 WL 2461048, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009) (quoting 
Musco, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 595) (“[A]n action for indemnity may be brought as an 
independent action subsequent to imposition of judgment against a tortfeasor 
since the cause of action ‘accrues not at the time of the commission of the tort 
for which indemnity is sought, but at the time of the payment of the 
judgment.’”); Salonia v. Samsol Homes, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189-90 (App. 
Div. 1986) (citing Musco, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 593) (“Of particular relevance, the 
Judicial Conference report noted at page 214 that CPLR 1401 was to be 
applied not only to ‘joint tortfeasors’ but also to ‘successive and independent 
tortfeasor[s].’”); Mesta v. Fed. Realty Ltd. P’ship, No. 16748/04, 2011 WL 
2571037, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2011) (citing Musco, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589) 
(“The entry of a default judgment in a third-party action is not required prior 
to the determination of liability in the main action and before the cause of 
action for indemnity has accrued.”). 
308. 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (App. Div. 1968). 
309. Id. 
310. See id. 
311. 187 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1962). 
312. See Siegel, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834. 
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[A] contrary rule . . . might well lead to 
procrastination by the attorney to postpone the 
inevitable event of defeat. The author of the 
disaster should not be enabled to chart the 
strategy to avoid the liability for his own 
negligence. Otherwise, negligence could be 
disguised by the device of delay, and an attorney 
rewarded by immunity from the consequence of 
his negligence.313 
 
Hopkins’s “Siegel Continuing Representation” theory has been 
followed by courts throughout New York and remains good 
law.314 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
313. Id. at 835. 
314. See, e.g., DeStaso v. Condon Resnick, LLP, 936 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 
(App. Div. 2011) (“Causes of action alleging legal malpractice which would 
otherwise be time-barred are timely if the doctrine of continuous 
representation applies. In the legal malpractice context, the continuous 
representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations where there is a 
mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific 
subject matter underlying the malpractice claim.”) (citations omitted); Riley 
v. Segan, Nemerov, & Singer, P.C., No. 303097/08, 2009 WL 5299224, at *3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2009) (“[T]he rule recognizes that a person seeking 
professional assistance has a right to repose confidence in the professional's 
ability and good faith, and realistically cannot be expected to question and 
assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the services are 
rendered. Neither is a person expected to jeopardize his pending case or his 
relationship with the attorney handling that case during the period that the 
attorney continues to represent the person. Since it is impossible to envision 
a situation where commencing a malpractice suit would not affect the 
professional relationship, the rule of continuous representation tolls the 
running of the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice claim until the 
ongoing representation is completed.”) (citations omitted). See generally Jay 
C. Carlisle II, Recent Statute of Limitations Developments in the New York 
Court of Appeals, 30 PACE. L. REV. 1158, 1169-73 (2010). 
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B. In Rem Jurisdiction 
 
In Carr v. Carr,315 Hopkins reinstated a claim seeking a 
declaratory judgment that recognized the plaintiff’s past 
marital relation with the defendant’s husband.316 In the lower 
court, the defendant successfully moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the grounds that, although New York courts had 
discretion to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked both 
personal and in rem jurisdiction over the defendant.317 Hopkins 
observed that the subject matter, regarding interrelated 
matrimonial actions, was inherently within the court’s powers 
to adjudicate.318 He further stated that New York was a proper 
venue for the plaintiff’s action, as the plaintiff had established 
that sufficient contacts existed between the parties and New 
York State.319 In reaching his decision, Hopkins explained that 
New York maintained a continuing interest in the 
determination of domiciliary rights that involved a controversy 
over survivor benefits with outsiders.320 Although the Court of 
Appeals later reversed Hopkins’s findings, both Chief Judge 
Charles D. Breitel and Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York 
Court of Appeals chose to side with the rationale advanced by 
Hopkins.321 
 
 
 
315. 400 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107 (App. Div. 1977). “The action is brought for a 
declaratory judgment adjudging that the plaintiff is the lawful surviving 
spouse of Paul Bennett Carr, deceased, and that a divorce from the plaintiff 
allegedly obtained in Honduras by Carr during his lifetime is invalid. The 
defendant, Carr's wife by a marriage subsequent to the divorce, moved to 
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, both of the person and of 
subject matter.” Id. at 106. 
316. See id. at 106-07. 
317. See id. at 107. 
318. See id. at 107-08. 
319. See id. at 108-09. 
320. Id. at 109. 
321. Carr v. Carr, 385 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (N.Y. 1978) (Breitel, C.J., & 
Wachtler, J., dissenting) (“We dissent and vote to affirm on the opinion of Mr. 
Justice James D. Hopkins at the Appellate Division in which the concededly 
difficult problem in this case is elaborated with a keen sense for the legal and 
policy reasons for the result. We indorse the analysis and it would be 
supererogation to substitute an elaboration for that of Mr. Justice Hopkins.”). 
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C. Public Policy 
 
Ellish v. Airport Parking Co.322 is illustrative of Hopkins’s 
ability to address the evolution of law and related public policy 
matters. In Ellish, an action for damages had been brought 
against an airport company operating at Kennedy Airport, 
alleging that the company was liable for the loss of the 
plaintiff’s car, which disappeared while parked in an enclosed 
parking lot.323 Affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, 
Hopkins decided that the parking of the car within the enclosed 
lot could not have constituted a bailment given the manner in 
which the defendant’s parking lot functioned—alleviating their 
duty to preserve, protect, and oversee the vehicles stationed 
therein.324 Hopkins appreciated the sensitive circumstances 
 
322. 345 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. Div. 1973); see also In re Glenford S., 435 
N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Div. 1981). In Glenford S., the Appellate Division held 
that the pertinent statutory provisions require that Grand Jury minutes 
should be included within the “pleadings and proceedings” within the Family 
Court. Id. at 294. Reading subdivision 8 of section 725.05 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law (“CPL”) and subdivision 3 of section 731 of the Family Court 
Act together, the court concluded that the clear legislative expressions 
manifest the intent that the Grand Jury minutes in a case transferred to the 
Family Court shall form part of the petition in a delinquent offender 
proceeding. Id. at 295, rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Larry W. v. Corp. 
Counsel of N.Y.C., 433 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1982). 
323. See Ellish, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 651. 
324. Id. at 653-55. The most relevant and applicable factors that 
Hopkins used in arriving at his decision were written as follows: 
 
The service provided by the defendant was impersonal. The 
plaintiff was aware that the defendant had no employees 
either to deliver the ticket for the automobile or to park the 
automobile. She accepted the ticket from an automatic 
dispensing device and she parked the car herself, choosing 
her own space, not at the direction of the defendant. 
. . . The plaintiff retained as much control as possible over 
the automobile. . . . 
. . . 
. . . [S]he read the other warnings which it contained to the 
effect that the lot was not attended and that the parking of 
her car was at her own risk. Thus, any expectation that the 
defendant would take special precautions to protect her car 
while she was away could not reasonably have been in her 
mind. 
. . . The actual operation of an airport parking lot must have 
been apparent to her. . . . The plaintiff . . . should have 
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presented by the plaintiff’s case, but stressed that changing 
times warranted changes in the law.325 On behalf of the court, 
Hopkins held: 
 
We are of the opinion that liability should not be 
determined by ancient labels and characteristics 
not connected with present-day practices. It is 
one thing for the owner of a livery stable to have 
to explain the disappearance of a horse . . . to the 
owner, but it is not at all the same for the 
operator of a parking lot at a busy airport to have 
to explain the disappearance from the lot of one 
of the thousands of cars parked there daily.326 
 
Another example of Hopkins’s public policy expertise is 
shown in New York v. Local 1115 Joint Board, Nursing Home 
& Hospital Employees’ Division, where a labor dispute had led 
to a possible strike by nursing home employees.327 Hopkins had 
to decide whether or not the lower court had the authority to 
grant a preliminary injunction to stop the nursing home 
employees from going on strike.328 The lower court had granted 
a preliminary injunction against the nursing home’s labor 
union prohibiting a strike.329 
 
 
 
 
 
 
realized the gigantic task which an individual check-out of 
each automobile would require—a task which she was 
aware the defendant did not undertake, since the ticket 
which she received did not identify her automobile. 
 
Id. at 653-54. 
325. See id. at 655. Hopkins focused on the fact that the “use of air 
transportation is a major interest in our social and economic life, [and that] it 
is important that a fair rule, easy to apply, should govern.” Id. at 653. 
326. Id. at 655. 
327. 392 N.Y.S.2d 884 (App. Div. 1977). 
328. See id. at 855. 
329. Id. 
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While recognizing federal preemption in the field of labor 
law,330 Hopkins found that both state and federal courts have 
jurisdiction over actions arising out of the breach of labor 
contracts.331 In the interest of public policy, Hopkins argued 
that the state legislature should be able to protect and promote 
the public health,332 have the authority to discontinue any 
activity that endangers public wellbeing,333 and be allowed to 
regulate nursing home facilities.334 Hopkins was compelled by 
the fact that the patients were unable to care for themselves, 
the lack of suitable alternative facilities, the imminence of the 
 
330. Id. at 887; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s 
Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (holding that 
California’s state court had no jurisdiction to enter an award for damages 
based on the tortuousness of picketing under California law because of the 
preemption by the federal National Labor Relations Act); Lodge 76, Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 
427 U.S. 132 (1976). In Lodge 76, an employer filed an unfair labor practice 
complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, which 
entered a cease and desist order against a union refusing to work overtime 
during renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 135. The 
United States Supreme Court held that the refusal to work overtime should 
be preempted by the federal labor laws, and should not be frustrated by the 
state. Id. at 155; see also Manfredonia v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 
(App Div. 1979). Passengers, husband and wife, sued airline for damages for 
injury sustained when wife was assaulted by an intoxicated airline 
passenger. Id. at 286-87. Hopkins held that the New York Dram Shop Act 
was inapplicable because federal law preempts it. Id. at 290. 
331. See Local 1115 Joint Bd., 392 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. 
332. See id. at 889. 
 
The State Constitution (art. XVII, s. 3) provides that “[t]he 
protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of 
the state are matters of public concern and provision 
therefor shall be made by the state and by such of its 
subdivisions and in such manner, and by such means as the 
legislature shall from time to time determine.” 
 
Id. (quoting the N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3). 
333. See id. at 889 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 12(5) (McKinney 
2012)) (“Specifically, it is the duty of the Attorney-General, on request of the 
State Commissioner, ‘to bring an action for an injunction against any person 
who violates, disobeys or disregards . . . any lawful notice, order or 
regulation.’”). 
334. See id. (“In short, the State Commissioner was empowered by 
legislative enactment to supervise and regulate fully and comprehensively 
the operation and management of nursing homes, to the end that the health 
of the patients might be completely promoted and protected.”). 
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strike, and the failure of defendants to seek alternative 
methods for resolving the dispute before commencing the 
strike.335 This led to his conclusion that there existed a danger 
to public health, and therefore, he directed that the injunction 
to stop the strike was proper.336 
 
VIII. Gender Bias 
 
During Hopkins judicial service, “the courts [were] viewed 
by a substantial group of [the] citizenry as a male-dominated 
institution disposed to discriminate against persons who [were] 
not part of its traditional constituency.”337 Women endured a 
workplace environment plagued with condescension, 
indifference, and hostility from their male peers.338 Such 
problems were perpetuated by ignorant male attorneys and 
judges, who often carried a belief that mere complaints by 
women were “contrivances of overwrought imaginations and 
hypersensitivities.”339 
 
335. See id. at 890. 
336. Id. (“In summary, we believe that the Attorney-General, acting 
under proper instruction from the State Commissioner, may, in a case which 
it is demonstrated that the state interests in promoting and protecting the 
health of its inhabitants are seriously threatened by a strike, seek an 
injunction and that, on such a showing, the Supreme Court may grant an 
injunction against the strike.”). 
337. TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., 
N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., SUMMARY REPORT 3 (1986), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/ny-task-force-on-women-
in-the-courts-summary.pdf. Women began to enter the legal profession in 
greater numbers from the 1960s into the 1980s, and increasingly represented 
all facets of the New York's legal system, government, private practice, the 
judiciary, and professional organizations. See id. at 2-3 at 29. Although there 
was some recognition of women rights at this time, and social improvements, 
males continued to dominate in employment and professional relations over 
women, who were mostly limited to the domestication of the family life. See 
id. 
338. See id. at 29-30. Despite the enactment of the Equitable 
Distribution Law, sexual discrimination was rampant and implementation of 
change proved difficult. See id. at 17-19. 
339. Id. at 3. At the time, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, 
Lawrence H. Cooke, defined “gender bias” as “embracing ‘decisions . . . made 
or actions taken because of weight given to preconceived notions of sexual 
roles rather than upon a fair and unswayed appraisal of merit as to each 
person or situation.’” Id. at 1-2. 
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Devoted to a career of equality and fairness, Hopkins 
remained respectful and professional, regardless of gender. He 
devotedly worked to overcome gender stereotypes both within 
and outside the court. Hopkins always ensured litigants, 
attorneys, and his staff that only the facts and law would be 
influential forces within his courtroom.340 Frances Schoenbach, 
a former law assistant of Hopkins, praised him for his devotion 
to fairness and noted that many women who entered the legal 
profession during that time appreciated Hopkins’s presence 
and the impact he made on “women attorneys accustomed at 
best to tolerant condescension.”341 
 
A.  Maternity Leave 
 
Hopkins’s jurisprudence on “gender fairness” was best 
illustrated in cases involving employment policies regulating 
maternity leave. For example, in Board of Education of Union 
Free School District No. 2, Nassau County v. New York State 
Division of Human Rights,342 Hopkins voided a school district’s 
policy of unpaid maternity leave and requirement that women 
leave no later than five months prior to the anticipated birth of 
 
340. For example, Frances Schoenbach, a law assistant during Hopkins's 
service, stated 
 
Women law assistants had particular cause for grateful 
surprise for [Judge Hopkins] always treated us as 
competent attorneys. When, at times, application of a 
familiar rule of law apparently led to an unjust result, 
thereby evoking from the law assistant a rebellious “It's 
unfair,” he did not terminate discussion with the comment 
that the law assistant's feelings did her credit. To the 
contrary, he quietly responded “That's not a legal 
argument.” 
 
A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 460 
341. Id. 
342. 345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 1973). Two separate proceedings were 
brought on appeal from an order of the Human Rights Appeal Board. Id. at 
95. The policy of the school required unpaid maternity leave and the 
requirement of a leave not later than five months prior to the anticipated 
birth of the child, despite the physical condition of the woman to continue 
working. See id. at 96. Hopkins affirmed the orders claiming the policy was 
discriminatory against pregnant teachers. Id. at 98. Additionally, he required 
the schools to alter their policy. Id. at 99. 
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the child. 
Specifically, Hopkins rejected the arbitrary leave 
requirement imposed upon women at the end of the fourth 
month of pregnancy, noting that such requirements did not 
achieve any feasible goals in the interest of the school or 
public.343 He stated that “[t]he biological phenomenon of 
conception and pregnancy is not limited to any particular 
period in the school year.”344 Hopkins found that the policy 
directly singled out pregnant women by requiring special 
treatment in determining the teacher’s leave.345 In comparison 
to other medical conditions, a leave of absence was not required 
until medically necessary.346 As a result, he concluded that the 
policy should be voided, as “the female teacher [was] placed 
under a restriction dependent on sex alone by the terms of the 
[school’s] policy.”347 
In Union Free School District No. 6, Nassau County v. New 
York State Division of Human Rights,348 Hopkins also rejected 
restrictive rules on maternity leave. Hopkins found that certain 
provisions349 contained within the employment contracts 
between a New York school district and the Teachers’ 
 
343. See id. at 98. 
344. Id. Hopkins aimed to eliminate this gender discrimination by ruling 
that, upon the desire to continue working, a pregnant teacher could submit at 
the fourth month of pregnancy a physician’s certificate declaring capability of 
continuing work. Id. at 99. 
345. Id. at 98. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. This case was considered under the statutory standard of the 
Human Rights Law, which served not only as a function of equal protection, 
but also provided a “more direct and positive focus.” Id. at 99. The Human 
Rights Law was narrower and concerned the protection of individuals from 
disparate treatment in regard to abilities, capacities, and qualifications. Id. 
348. 349 N.Y.S.2d 757 (App. Div. 1973). This proceeding reviewed an 
order of the State Human Rights Appeal Board, which affirmed the order of 
Division of Human Rights, which found sex discrimination was practiced 
against teachers who requested maternity leave from the petitioner school 
district. Id. at 760. The complaints against the Superintendent of the schools 
were dismissed. Id. The provisions of the contract between a teachers' 
association and the school district, insofar as terms of the maternity leaves, 
were deemed unreasonable and discriminatory. See id. 
349. Id. at 759. The terms of the contract required the women to 
discontinue working upon the third month of pregnancy, to accept their leave 
without pay, and to remain unemployed by the school district until the 
September following the birth of the child. Id. 
51
CARLISLE FINAL 2/28/2013  7:44 PM 
54 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
Association was discriminatory because “they treated 
pregnancy as a condition less liberally than all other physical 
conditions to which human beings are subject.”350 
 
B. Marital Disputes 
 
Hopkins wrote a number of leading opinions dealing with 
martial disputes that were also illustrative of his sensitivity 
towards gender fairness.351 For example, in Phillips v. Phillips, 
Hopkins stated that: 
 
A marriage, composed as it is of the delicate 
interrelationship of attitudes and temperaments, 
expressing the emotional and physical 
characteristics of two people changing over the 
years, must be placed in the balance by an 
objective and careful appraisal of the judge with 
the effect of the conduct of the parties upon that 
interrelationship and the increased burden 
which the law itself imposes on the parties . . . 
.352 
 
350. Id. at 760. 
351. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 419 N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div. 1979). The 
rationale used by Hopkins in deciding divorcee actions was continually relied 
upon in cases that arose after his retirement from the bench. See, e.g., S.K. v. 
I.K, No. 203247-2008, 2010 WL 1371943, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2010) 
(citing Phillips, 419 N.Y.S.2d 573) (“It has been held that the failure to prove 
that the abandonment lasted at least one year is a jurisdictional defect 
requiring the dismissal of said cause of action.”); C.W. v. G.W., No. 01112/05, 
2006 WL 6448614, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2006) (citing Phillips, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 573) (stating that “the abandonment must have ‘continued for at 
least one year.’”); McNeal v. McNeal, No. W2009-00160-COA-R3-CV, 2009 
WL 3270217, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2009) (citing Phillips, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 573) (reaffirming that “[w]here funds are on deposit in a joint 
account with right of survivorship, . . . during the lifetime of the joint tenants 
a rebuttable presumption arises that the parties own the money on deposit 
equally.”). 
352. Phillips, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 576, In Phillips, the wife had left the 
marital home and commenced an action for divorce on the ground of cruel 
and inhuman treatment. Id. at 575. She contended that she was a half owner 
of a joint bank account. Id. In response, defendant husband denied the 
allegations of cruelty and claimed that the plaintiff had abandoned him 
without justification. Id. On the eve of the trial, the defendant moved to 
amend his answer to allege a counterclaim for divorce on the ground of 
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Hopkins’s intuitive approach in marital disputes was 
illustrated in his handling of abandonment claims,353 where he 
set forth the requirement that the moving party must show 
evidence of “hardening of resolve.”354 Hopkins’s decision in 
John W. S. v. Jeanne F. S.355 was also influential to the 
progression of matrimonial law, requiring that alimony be 
denied when evidence of equal misconduct is shown by both 
spouses.356 
 
abandonment by the plaintiff for more than one year. See id. Speaking 
through Hopkins, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial 
court granting the defendant a divorce on the ground of abandonment, 
requiring proof of a “hardening of resolve” by one spouse not to live with the 
other. Id. at 577. 
353. Hopkins established that 
 
To grant a divorce on the ground of abandonment requires 
that one spouse not fulfill the basic obligations of the 
marriage relationship for a period of one year or more and 
that said conduct be unjustified and without the consent of 
the abandoned spouse. . . . [As a result,] a “hardening of 
resolve” by one spouse not to live with the other [has 
occurred]. 
 
Hage v. Hage, 492 N.Y.S.2d 172, 175 (App. Div. 1985) (citing Phillips, 419 
N.Y.S.2d at 577). Phillips held that it was improper for the trial court to 
grant a divorce on the ground of abandonment since the evidence showed that 
the plaintiff's departure was due to what she mistakenly believed to be the 
misconduct of the defendant and did not show a hardening of resolve and an 
irrevocable decision by the plaintiff not to live with the defendant. See 
Phillips, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 577. 
354. See Hage, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 175 (citing Phillips, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 577) 
(“The evidence must show a ‘hardening of resolve’ by one spouse not to live 
with the other.”); Wallin v. Wallin, 650 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1996) 
(quoting Hage, 492 NYS.2d at 175). 
355. 367 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1975). 
356. See id. at 818-19. Subsequent cases relied on Hopkins’s reasoning 
in John W. S. See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1017 (App. Div. 
1997) (citing John W. S., 367 N.Y.S.2d at 818-19) (“While the plaintiff may 
also be entitled to a divorce based upon the defendant's adulterous activity, 
the fact remains that she must be denied temporary alimony because of her 
own undisputed misconduct.”); Belandres v. Belandres, 395 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 
(App. Div. 1977) (quoting Farnella v. Farnella, 386 N.Y.S.2d 161 (App. Div. 
1976)) (citing John W. S., 367 N.Y.S.2d at 814) (“It is well settled that a wife 
who is guilty of conduct constituting grounds for divorce is not entitled to 
alimony . . . even in dual divorce cases”); Fomenko v. Fomenko, 374 N.Y.S.2d 
882, 884 (App. Div. 1975) (quoting Math v. Math, 331 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (App. 
Div. 1972), aff’d, 289 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 1972)) (citing John W. S., 367 
N.Y.S.2d at 814) (“The court properly construed section 236 of the Domestic 
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Related to these significant contributions, Hopkins 
authored other instructional decisions in the realm of martial 
law dealing with the division of marital property. For example, 
in Angelo v. Angelo, Hopkins ruled that the apportionment of 
an income tax refund from a joint return should not be subject 
to a test based on gift or property law, but rather by a more 
relaxed circumstantial examination of the financial 
arrangement of the household.357 He stated that courts should 
not be “fettered in achieving an equitable apportionment of 
assets on the dissolution of a marriage by the iron clasp of a 
mechanical formula.”358 Hopkins explained that the financial 
conditions between a husband and wife are “intensely 
personal,” as what may suit one household might not work for 
another.359 Notably, the approach implemented by Hopkins in 
Angelo v. Angelo was influential in the resolution of such 
marital disputes by the courts throughout the nation.360 
 
Relations Law as requiring denial of alimony to plaintiff, since her conduct 
was found, upon sufficient evidence, to ‘constitute grounds for separation or 
divorce.’”). 
357. 428 N.Y.S.2d 14, 18 (App. Div. 1980). 
358. Id. at 17. 
359. Id. 
360. See, e.g., Nill v. Nill, 584 N.E.2d 602, 605-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“The precise issue concerning the allocation of a tax refund from a jointly 
filed income tax return has not yet been addressed in Indiana. To our 
knowledge, the only case in which this specific issue was decided is Angelo v. 
Angelo. . . . Rather than relying on the rigid application of a mechanical 
formula to determine the allocation of an income tax refund, the court in 
Angelo reviewed the circumstances of the general financial background of the 
marriage. . . . We find this analysis persuasive, and applicable to this case.”) 
(citations omitted); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 561 S.E.2d 96, 100-01 (Ga. 2002) 
(Benham, Hunstein, & Hines, JJ., dissenting): 
 
I agree with the Angelo court that: [t]he financial 
arrangements between husband and wife are intensely 
personal; what suits one household would throw another in 
disarray. Sometimes the spouses join in discharging the 
financial responsibilities of the family; sometimes one 
spouse defers to the other in managing their affairs. 
Sometimes they agree to keep their individual earnings and 
property separately; sometimes they agree to merge them. 
Sometimes their agreement is formal; in most instances it is 
not. All of these circumstances must be weighed by the court 
when the marriage is no longer sustainable and the 
distribution of the family assets is the issue. The filing of a 
joint income tax return must therefore be viewed in the 
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/2
CARLISLE FINAL 2/28/2013  7:44 PM 
2013] JUSTICE JAMES D. HOPKINS 57 
IX. Conclusion 
 
Dean James D. Hopkins’s many contributions to Pace 
University, the Law School, and the legal profession are 
accurately summarized by former New York Appellate Division 
Presiding Justice Milton Mollen, who stated: 
 
Experience teaches us that every once in a while 
in the course of the history of a given field of 
endeavor, a person comes along who is truly a 
giant of his era. Such a person not only exerts a 
powerful influence upon his own times but leaves 
a permanent heritage for those who come 
afterwards. In the field of jurisprudence, in the 
history of the law and he search for true justice, 
it can be said with absolute assurance that 
Justice James D. Hopkins is such a man.361 
 
Hopkins was simply not inclined to stand by idly and 
passively, waiting for justice. “Fairness” and “Justice” were 
essential concepts in Hopkins’s approach in adjudicating the 
cases that arose before him.362 He recognized that the 
fundamental aspect of justice occurs when judges operate fairly 
without the influence of external forces: 
 
He believe[d] in a divinity that brings order to 
the universe. He believe[d] in the freedom and 
protection of the person as more recently defined 
by the words “human rights.” He believe[d] that 
among the human rights is the right to own and 
possess property. He believe[d] that it is the duty 
of government to protect the person and the 
property with its full authority and power.363 
 
circumstances of the general financial background of the 
marriage. 
 
Id. at 101. (quoting Angelo, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 17). 
361. A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 437. 
362. See id. at 444. 
363. Id. at 443. 
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Hopkins’s judicial works when dealing with criminal law 
and procedure were influential on the development of these 
areas of the law. In this regard, it is proper to reemphasize that 
the adoptions of Hopkins’s opinions by the highest court of New 
York “were more numerous and more consistent than . . . any 
other lower court judge.”364 As Court of Appeals Associate 
Judge, and former St. John’s Law School Dean, Judge Joseph 
W. Bellacosa observed that losing counsel must have taken 
some comfort from the fact that Hopkins dissented at the 
appellate division, because “[t]he expectation level for ultimate 
vindication must have run very high.”365 Further evidence of 
the Court of Appeals deference to Judge Hopkins is found in a 
statistical analysis of the cases he adjudicated. While Hopkins 
authored forty-one majority opinions between December 12, 
1978, and December 18, 1981, only one noteworthy decision 
was reversed366 and one judgment modified.367 
Upon his unfortunate passing on January 5, 1996, it was 
clear that the citizens of Westchester, the New York State 
Judiciary, and his students and colleagues at Pace University 
School of Law were blessed to be amidst greatness. 368 No words 
 
364. Bellacosa, supra note 36, at 463. 
365. Id. at 476. 
366. See Carr v. Carr, 400 N.Y.S.2d. 105 (App. Div. 1977), rev’d, 385 
N.E.2d 1234 (N.Y. 1978). 
367. Auerbach v Bennett, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 
393 N.E. 994 (N.Y. 1979). In an opinion by Hopkins, the appellate division 
held that the business judgment doctrine should not be interpreted to stifle a 
stockholder’s legitimate scrutiny of management decisions that required 
investigation by outside directors and which presented apparent situations of 
conflict of interest. Id. at 107. Further, the court held that the special 
committee’s report should not be immune from scrutiny by an interpretation 
of the business judgment doctrine that compelled the acceptance of the 
findings of the report. Id. The court determined that the plaintiff’s complaint 
should not be summarily dismissed on the ground that a committee of 
allegedly disinterested directors had decided that the corporate interests 
would not be promoted by a derivative action. See id. at 108. The court 
reasoned that the plaintiff had not yet been afforded the opportunity of 
pretrial discovery and examination before trial. See id. at 107-8. However, the 
court did caution that summary judgment might be the appropriate vehicle to 
terminate the action, after the usual discovery and deposition stages of the 
action were completed, when the record showed that the disinterest of the 
directors was not refuted, the underlying facts were thoroughly investigated 
and cogent reasons existed in support of the committee’s decision. Id. at 108. 
368. Obituary, James Hopkins, 84, Appeals Court Judge, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan, 7, 1996, available at 
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could express the breadth of Hopkins’s legacy or the impact he 
had on those around him. To those that he served, knew, and 
touched—he will forever be remembered. For eighty-four years, 
the people of New York were blessed by Hopkins’s presence. 
The Pace Law School, former students, alumni, faculty, deans, 
and staff remember Dean Hopkins with fondness, respect, and 
affection. The legacy of James D. Hopkins, the Justice, the 
Dean, will endure forever. 
Hopkins was an accomplished attorney, judge, and human 
being. We will remember Hopkins for his many scholarly 
accomplishments and open-handedness to the legal community. 
We will remember Hopkins as a leader in all aspects of life, a 
man of commitment, passion, and unfettered integrity. We will 
remember Hopkins as a man of moral excellence, who stood in 
a class by himself. 
Dean James D. Hopkins, we salute you and we will 
continue to miss your wisdom and leadership. 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/07/nyregion/james-hopkins-84-appeals-
court-judge.html. While the legal profession was saddened by his passing on 
January 5, 1996, we are still exalted by the legacy the judicial, moral, and 
personable memories for which he left behind. At the time of his passing, 
Judge Hopkins was survived by his wife of fifty-eight years, Bertha Bower 
Hopkins; his son, David, of Mohegan Lake, N.Y.; his daughter, Cynthia 
Smith of Toms River, N.J.; his sister, Marguerite Lewis of Armonk, and two 
grandchildren. Id. 
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